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l. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last several years two approaches have been taken 
to tempering the extraterritorial application of the United States 
antitrust laws. In October 1982 the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982 (the "FTAIA") was signed into law. 1 In 
addition, for the past four years the American Law Institute has 
been engaged in an effort to revise thoroughly the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. It is expected that this 
effort will culminate in May 1986 with the promulgation of the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) 
(the "Restatement (Revised)"). 2 These two efforts take different, 
and in certain respects inconsistent, positions on the sensitive matter 
of antitrust jurisdiction. The purpose of this article is to analyze 
• Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Richmond, Virginia. 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 (note), 6a, 45(a) (1982). 
2. In March 1981 the American Law Institute published Tentative Draft No. 2 
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), which 
contained several provisions applicable to the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction. These 
provisions were reworked and republished in April 1985 within Tentative Draft No. 6. 
This article discusses three sections of the Restatement (Revised): §§ 402, 403, and 
415. The text of these and any other sections used throughout this article, unless 
otherwise indicated, is that contained in Tentative Draft No. 6, which was tentatively 
approved during the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, May 14-
17, 1985. A tentative final draft of the entire Restatement (Revised), including the 
versions of§§ 402, 403, and 415 contained in Tentative Draft No. 6, was prepared in 
mid-July, 1985. Written comment on its provisions will be accepted until early December, 
1985. Thereafter a final version will be prepared and submitted for a vote to promulgate 
at the 1986 meeting. This final version will be the tentative final version, except as to 
any changes made by the Reporters and Council of the ALI in response to written 
submissions. See Statement Regarding Preparation of Final Version of the Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law, distributed at the 1985 Annual Meeting. (A copy of this 
statement is on file at the office of the University of Cincinnati Law Review). Although 
the text of§§ 402, 403, and 415 contained in Tentative Draft No. 6 cannot be deemed 
the final version of these sections, it is unlikely that the final version of them will differ 
in substance from that contained in Tentative Draft No. 6. 
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780 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
these efforts and to show some of their common points and 
differences. 
Concern over an excessively expansive extraterritorial applica-
tion of the United States antitrust laws is well known. 3 Our trading 
partners abroad have publicly protested, 4 and some of them have 
passed retaliatory legislation. 5 It is quite clear, however, that the 
FTAIA is not directly responsive to our trading partners' concerns. 
While the circumspections in application of the antitrust laws 
which it effects may in some respects meet their concerns, the 
FT AlA was not passed for the purpose of accomodating our 
trading partners. Any advantage the FT AlA provides them is 
largely incidental. 6 The aim of the Restatement (Revised) on this 
3. See, e.g., A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
365-72 (2d ed. 1970); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ExTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. 
ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAws O. Griffin ed. 1979); Henry, The United States Antitrust 
Laws: A Canadian Viewpoint, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249 (1970); Jacobs, Extraterritorial 
Application of Competition Laws: An English View, 13 INT'L LAw 645 (1979); Lowe, Blocking 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 7 5 AM. j. 
INT'L L. 257 (1981); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United 
States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW 585 (1981 ); Triggs, Reach of U.S. Anti- Trust Legislation: 
The International Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers' 
Cartel, 12 MELB. U.L. REv. 250 (1979); International Law Association, Report on the 
Fifty-First Conference at Tokyo 569-73 ( 1964). See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, 
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §§ 8.14-.23 (2d ed. 1981). 
4. See, e.g., Note of july 27, 1978, from British Embassy in Washington to the 
Department of State, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 352 (1979); Note of Nov. 8, 1978, from 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to the United States Ambassador in 
Ottowa, CAN. Y .B. INT'L L. 335 (1979); Consultative Shipping Group (CSG) Secretariat, 
United States Policy Towards Regulation of Liner Shipping Oanuary, 1978), BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 386 (1978)(CSG is a shipping conference comprised of numerous European 
countries and Japan); Hilder, Holders of 100,000 Transatlantic Tickets Must Pay Fare of 
Flights, Britain Says, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1984, at 35, col.3. See generally 1 J. ATWOOD 
& K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, §§ 4.04-.15. 
5. See, e.g., Law No. 80-538, 1980 j.O. 1799, reprinted and translated in 75 AM. j. 
INT'L L. 382-83 (1981)(France); Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2), N.Z. Stat. 173, 
No. 27 (1980)(New Zealand); Protection of Trading Interests Act, c. 11 (1980)(United 
Kingdom); Foreign Anti-Trust judgments (Restriction of Enforcement), No. 13, Austl. 
Acts P. (1979)(Australia); Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. 
& Regs. 76-644 (Sept. 21, 1976), amended by Can. Cons. Regs., ch. 366 (Canada). 
6. The legislative history of the FTAIA stresses the need for certainty with respect 
to the applicable standard of review and the need to loosen the strictures of the antitrust 
laws, both for the benefit of the United States participants in foreign commerce. See 
infra notes 15-17 and 21 a'nd accompanying text (legislative history). However, at the 
beginning of several days of hearings on a bill, which in modified form became the 
FTAIA (see note 14 and accompanying text), Rep. Peter Rodino did note the concern 
of our allies over the uncertain and expansive application of these laws. He stated that 
"[s]ome foreign animosity toward U.S. antitrust enforcement might also be eliminated, 
because the domestic effects standard being proposed would· limit the reach of our 
antitrust laws in a manner consistent with our major trading partners.'' Foreign Trade 
1986] ANTITRUST JUSRISDICTION 781 
point, in contrast, is to balance the legitimate concerns of the 
United States and other nations. The interests of the various states 
affected by a particular business practice are to be taken into 
account as part of the process of determining whether a court has 
jurisdiction over a matter. 7 
II. THE FoREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST 
IMPROVEMENTS AcT OF 1982 
A. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 
The FT AlA and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 
(the "ETCA") together comprise Public Law No. 97-290, which 
President Reagan signed into law on October 8, 1982.8 The stated 
legislative purpose of the ETCA is, in part, to encourage increased 
export of United States goods and services by facilitating the 
formation of export trading companies and by easing the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws to certain export trade activities. 9 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981: Hearings on H. R. 2326 Before the Subcommittee on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981)(introductory remarks of Rep. Rodino) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings). 
7. See infra notes 14 7 ·50 and accompanying text (further discussion of contrasting 
approaches of Restatement (Revised) and FTAIA on balancing of state interest analysis). 
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982)(Title 1), 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4, 1841, 1843 
(1982)(Title II); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982)(Title III); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 (note), 6a, 
45(a) (1982)(Title IV). 
9. The codified legislative purpose of the ETCA is "to increase United States 
exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade 
services to United States producers and suppliers ... and by modifying the application 
of the antitrust laws to certain export trade." 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982). This 
legislative purpose does not apply to the FT AlA because it is a separate title within 
Public Law No. 97-290. It stands independent from the other titles, with no cross 
references to or use of the defined terms from the other titles. 
As enacted, § 102(b)'of Pub. L. 97-290, which states the purpose of the ETCA, 
used the term "Act" instead of "Chapter" in the first line, thereby creating confusion 
as to whether § 102 applies only to the ETCA or to the entire Pub. L. 97-290. See id. 
§ 4001 (note). The reference is clarified in the United States Code by use of the word 
"Chapter." See id. § 4001(b). Furthermore, the Conference Report on the Export 
Trading Company Act of 1982 indicates that the definitions contained in Title 1 are 
confined to that title. H. CoNF. REP. No. 294, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 
U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. NEws 2501-02. The point is not very significant because the 
legislative history of the FT AlA reflects substantially the same purpose as that set forth 
in§ 102(b) of Pub. L. 97-290. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (legislative 
history of FTAIA). 
For an analysis of the ETCA, see Bruce & Peirce, Understanding The Export Trading 
Company Act and Using (Or Avoiding) Its Antitrust Exemptions, 38 Bus. LAw. 975 (1983); 
Golden & Kolb, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An American Response to Foreign 
Competition, 58 NoTRE DAME LAw. 743 (1983); see also B. HAwK, UNITED STATEs, 
CoMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A CoMPARATIVE GumE 20 (Supp. 
1982); Acheson, The Export Trading Company Act: A Year Downstream, 18 INT'L LAw. 389 
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Under Title III of the ETCA, persons may seek a certificate 
of review from the Secretary of Commerce for their export trade 
activities. 10 To obtain a certificate of review, the applicant must 
establish to the Secretary's satisfaction that the export trade activity 
meets certain criteria. The applicants must demonstrate, among 
other things, that the export trade activities for which they seek 
the certificate will not substantially lessen domestic competition 
nor substantially restrict the export trade of any competitor. 11 
One consequence of obtaining the certificate is that criminal and 
civil actions may not be brought by the government against the 
applicant on the ground that the conduct covered by the certificate 
violates the antitrust laws. 12 Although the statute does not im-
munize the certificate holder from private damage or injunctive 
relief actions for violation of the antitrust laws, any recovery m 
such suits is limited to actual damages plus expenses. n 
B. The Purposes of the FTAIA 
The FTAIA stands as a separate and independant title within 
Public Law No. 97-290. 14 Although the FTAIA does not contain 
(1984); Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: the Continuing Need for 
Reassessment, 51 FoRo. L. REv. 201 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hawk, International 
Antitrust Policy); Shenefield, Extraterritoriality in Antitrust, 15 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1109 
( 1983); Swan, International Antitrust: The Reach and Efficacy of United States Law, 63 Ore. 
L. Rev. 177, 211 (1984); Victor, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: New Antitrust 
Protection for Exporters (and New Opportunities for Lawyers), 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 917 (1984). 
Relations with respect to the certification procedures are contained in 48 Fed. 
Reg. 10,596 (1983)(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.1-.14). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4012 (1982). 
11. /d. § 4013. 
12. The parameters of this immunity from governmental prosecution are not explicit 
in the statutory language. Section 306(a) of the ETCA states that "[e]xcept as provided 
in subsection (b), no criminal or civil action may be brought under the antitrust laws 
against a person to whom a certificate of review is issued which is based on conduct 
which is specified in, and complies with the terms of, a certificate [of review]." /d. § 
4016(a). This section does not mention public civil or criminal prosecutorial actions. 
Section 306(b )( 1) of the ETCA provides that a person injured as a result of conduct 
covered by a certificate may sue for damages or injunctive relief. /d. § 4016(b). Because 
this subsection provides for private suits, § 306(a) must apply to governmental actions. 
See Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 1010-12; Golden & Kolb, supra note 9, at 778-79. 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982). 
14. The genesis of the FTAIA is H.R. 2326, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1981, introduced by Reps. Rodino and McClory in 1981. H.R. 2326, 
97th Cong, 1st Sess., 127 CoNe. REc. 3538 (1981). This bill was referred to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary and in turn to its Subcommittee on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law. The Subcommittee held three days of hearings on the bill in March, 
April, and June, 1981. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 6; see also Garvey, The Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, 14 L. & POL'Y lNT'L Bus. 1 (1982). The Subcommittee 
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an explicitly enacted legislative purpose, as does the ETCA, 15 the 
purposes of the FT AlA are set forth clearly in its legislative 
history. These purposes substantially mirror the codified legislative 
purposes of the ETCA. First, the FTAlA is intended to "encourage 
the business community to engage in efficiency producing joint 
conduct in the export of American goods and services.'' 16 Second, 
the FTAlA is intended to amend the Sherman Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act to articulate a statutory test for determin-
ing whether United States antitrust jurisdiction exists over certain 
international transactions. 17 Again, these purposes do not evidence 
a desire to curb application of the antitrust laws as an accomodation 
to our trading partners. The legislation is intended primarily to 
ease the application of these laws against United States firms 
engaged in export trade so that the firms may compete more 
effectively. 
With respect to its first objective, the FTAlA was put forth by 
its sponsors and others as a straight-forward alternative means of 
facilitating exports without the cumbersome certificate of review 
procedure codified in the ETCA. 18 The ETCA and the FT AlA 
operate cumulatively, although they are two separate circumscrip-
tions of the same antitrust laws. 19 They provide two-fold relief for 
introduced H.R. 5235 as a substitute for the original version of the bill. See H.R. 5235, 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 
CoNe. REG. H9670 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981). The House Committee on the judiciary 
unanimously reported H.R. 5235, as amended. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & Ao. NEws 2487 (hereinafter cited as HousE 
REPORT). The House passed H.R. 5235. 128 CoNe. REG. H4984 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 
1982). During the conference on the ETCA, H.R. 5235 was added as a separate title 
to obtain House approval of the ETCA. See Moore, Late Addition May Prove to be Key to 
Export Act, Legal Times, Oct. 11, 1982, at 1; see also 128 CoNe. REG. H8341-50 (daily 
ed. Oct. 1, 1982)(Conference Report on S. 734, Export Trading Company Act of 1981 ); 
Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 977-78 n.18-20 (legislative history of FTAIA). 
15. See supra note 9 (purpose of ETCA). 
16. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2; see 128 CoNe. REG. H4981 (daily ed. Aug. 
3, 1982)(Rep. Rodino explaining purposes of FTAIA). 
17. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2-3; see 128 CoNe. REG. H4981 (daily ed. 
Aug. 3, 1982)(Rep. Rodino explaining purposes of FTAIA). 
18. See, e.g., 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-2 (introductory remarks of Rep. 
Rodino), 70 (Shenefield statement), 96 (Atwood statement); Bruce & Peirce, supra note 
9, at 977-78 (legislative history of FTAIA). 
19. The definition of antitrust laws in § l03(a)(7) of the ETCA includes §§ 1-7 of 
the Sherman Act, which in turn have been amended by § 402 of the FTAIA. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6a & 4002(a)(7) (1982). Because § 402 provides relief for conduct outside 
the United States by direct amendment of the Sherman Act, the utility of the certification 
procedure is certainly diminished. Enterprises engaged in the export trade can take 
advantage of either the certification procedure, or rely on § 402, or both. See generally 
Golden & Kolb, supra note 9, at 780-81; Moore, supra note 14, at 1. 
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the United States export trade, freeing it from certain constraints 
in order to compete more effectively in the world market. 211 At 
the same time the FT AlA and the ETCA provide little relief to 
our trading partners from what they perceive as an excessive ap-
plication of antitrust laws to conduct engaged in within their ter-
ritories and by their citizens. 
Congress did consider the separate objective subject matter 
test21 of the FT AlA to be an advantage to our trading partners. 22 
However, Congress did not believe that enactment of a codified 
standard represented a significant change from present law. 23 
Moreover, while the codified standard limits the application of 
the Sherman Act somewhat, our trading partners' concern is more 
centered on application of our law to conduct in their countries 
which nevertheless would be reviewable even under the new 
standard, or on the use of our discovery techniques. 
C. The FTAIA Amendments to the Sherman Act 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The FTAIA component of Public Law No. 97-290 consists of 
two substantive sections. One, section 402, amends the Sherman 
Act; 24 the other, section 403, amends section 45 of the Federal 
20. The legislative history is replete with opinions to the effect that the antitrust 
laws in fact do not hinder the export trade. See e.g., 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 43-
44 (Rahl statement), 71 (Shenefield statement); HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. It 
was thought that there existed nonetheless a perception, especially among executives of 
small and medium-size companies, that the antitrust laws hamper efficiency in export 
activities. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 10 (Baldridge statement); HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 4. 
21. See infra notes 97-119 and accompanying text (explanation of FTAIA's objective 
standard for determining jurisdictional reach of Sherman Act). 
22. The House Report states that this standard is '' [a J clear benchmark . . . for 
businessmen, attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners." HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 2-3. And it ventured the thought that the "clarified reach of our own 
laws could encourage our trading partners to take more effective steps to protect 
competition in their markets." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14. 
23. See infra note 107 and accompanying· text (legislative history of FT AlA and 
ideas of commentators). 
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Section 402 provides: 
The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
6 the following new section: 
SEC. 7. This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
( I) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, 
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, or a person 
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Trade Commission Act. 25 Before considering the FTAIA modifi-
cations of the Sherman Act in detail, several preliminary obser-
vations may be useful. 
First, the FT AlA directly amends two of the antitrust laws, the 
Sherman Act and section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. By contrast, the ETCA does not change any antitrust law. 
Instead, it provides limited immunity from scrutiny under all 
antitrust laws for conduct covered by the certificate of review. 
The ETCA defines antitrust laws as virtually all state and federal 
antitrust laws. 26 Hence, while the ETCA does not amend any of 
the antitrust laws, it makes all of them partially inapplicable to 
conduct covered by the certificate of review. The cumulative 
protection afforded by the FT AlA and the ETCA is apparent.. 
For example, the ETCA provides partial immunity from attack 
under the Sherman Act for conduct covered by the certificate. 
H6wever, that same conduct may already have been exempted 
from antitrust challenge by virtue of the FT AlA's direct amend-
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2)such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this Act, other than 
this section. 
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph 
( l )(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export 
business in the United States. 
/d. § 6a. 
25. /d. § 45(a). Section 403 provides: 
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (U.S.C. 45(a)) is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: 
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving 
commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless-
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect-
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import 
commerce with foreign nations; or 
(ii) on export commerce with for~ign nations, of a person engaged in such 
commerce in the United States; and 
(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, 
other than this paragraph. 
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the 
peration of subparagraph (A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct 
only for injury to export business in the United States. 
/d. § 45(a). Because of the substantive similarity between §§ 402 and 403, this article 
concentrates on § 402, the amendment to the Sherman Act. 
26. Section l03(a)(7) of the ETCA provides: "For purposes of this title ... (7) 
the term 'antitrust laws' means the antitrust laws as defined in subsection (a) of the 
first section of the Clayton Act ... section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to 
the extent that section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition, and any State 
antitrust or unfair competition law." /d. § 4002(a)(7); see supra note 19 (further 
discussion of definition of antitrust laws). 
786 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
ment of the Sherman Act. Second, the FTAIA's amendment of 
the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act leaves 
these statutes and the case law interpretations of them unaffected 
unless they are directly changed by the FTAIA. Finally, the 
FTAIA has nothing to do with issues of personal jurisdiction. It 
qualifies the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act and narrows the ambit of 
damages for violations of these statutes. 
2. THE REvisioNs oF THE SHERMAN AcT BY THE FT AlA 
a. The ·First Revision: The Bifurcation of Foreign Commerce 
Section 402 of the FT AlA contains three substantive revisions 
to the Sherman Act. It narrows the scope of application of the 
Sherman Act (the introduction and subsection (1)), codifies the 
effects standard (subsection (1)), and narrows the scope of injury 
(last sentence). The first of the three changes to the Sherman Act 
contains two significant departures from prior law on the threshold 
question of what kind of conduct is cognizable under the Sherman 
Act. Prior to the FTAIA, section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribed 
contracts, conspiracies, and similar conduct in restraint of trade 
"among the several States, or with foreign nations. " 27 Similarly, 
section 2 prohibited every monopoly or attempt to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce ''among the several States, or 
with foreign nations. " 28 
As evolved in the case law and commentary, restraints of trade 
with foreign nations had traditionally been divided into import 
trade or commerce (into the United States), export trade or 
commerce (out of the United States)/9 and, to a lesser extent, 
totally foreign trade or commerce (neither into nor out of the 
United States). 30 The same methodology and, generally speaking, 
the same standards were used to review anti-competitive conduct 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (emphasis added). 
28. !d. § 2 (emphasis added). 
29. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, §§ 6.01-.22; 1 W. FuGATE, FoREIGN 
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS§§ 2.19-.20 (3d eel. 1982); 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW § 7.5-.6 (1980). 
30. See Rahl, Foreign Commerce jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 521 ( 1974) [hereinafter cited as Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction]; "'Rahl, American 
Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CoRN. INT'L L.J. 1 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Rahl, American Antitrust]; see also 128 GONG. REc. H4981 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 
1982). 
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occurring in any of the three categories of foreign commerce.:ll 
The type of foreign commerce affected by the restraint was less 
critical. 
The FTAIA represents a clean break from that approach. The 
Sherman Act's notion of restraints of trade or commerce among 
foreign nations has been bifurcated by the FT AlA into two separate 
classes of foreign commerce. Depending on the category into 
which the conduct is placed, different legal consequences will 
follow. One category consists of import trade and commerce; the 
other is comprised of export trade and commerce and totally 
foreign trade and commerce. The parenthetical phrase "(other 
than import trade and import commerce)":J2 is used in the 
introductory portion of section 402 to distinguish the import 
commerce category from the other categories of foreign commerce 
and to assure that the two components of the other category are 
treated in exactly the same manner.:~:~ 
As a consequence of this bifurcation of foreign commerce, two 
separate regimes of antitrust law now exist in the foreign commerce 
setting. The language of the introductory portion of section 402-
"This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce 
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations 
unless":14-means that the remainder of section 402 is inapplicable 
to import commerce restraints. Consequently, traditional antitrust 
standards and doctrine, unaffected by section 402, will continue 
to be employed in reviewing alleged anti-competitive practices 
involving import commerce. Conversely, conduct involving ex-
ports or totally foreign trade or commerce will be subject to, or 
have the advantage of, depending on one's perspective, the more 
rigorous standards of section 402( 1) and (2) of the FT AlA. The 
31. Examples of cases involving the three categories of foreign commerce are: ( 1) 
imports into the United States: United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 
416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. The Watchmakers ofSwitzerland Information 
Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH), 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); (2) exports from the 
United States: Continentia! Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 
(1962); United States v. Minnesota Mfg. & Mining Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 
1950); and (3) neither imports nor exports: Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Societe 
Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armement, 451.F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 406 (1972); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1095 (1969); Dominicus Americana Bohia v. 
Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
32. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
33. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
788 CINCINNA Tl LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54; 
legislative history is clear on this point,:15 as Is the statutory 
language. 
The ultimate importance of this distinction between import 
commerce on the one hand and exports and totally foreign 
commerce on the other is uncertain. As yet there has been little 
judicial construction or application of section 402.:16 The answer 
depends on whether the other substantive portions of section 402 
alter the Sherman Act to the extent that use of section 402( 1) 
and (2) leads to different results than use of the old version of 
the Sherman Act. 
From the perspective of our trading partners, however, the 
distinction may be somewhat dismaying. The application of the 
Sherman Act has been tightened with respect to the export trade, 
for the benefit of United States exporters. But conduct involving 
imports into the United States will continue to be reviewed as 
though section 402 did not exist. Many of the cases which have 
caused great concern abroad are those involving imports into the 
35. The House Report states that the "other than import trade" phrase was used 
to make "clear that wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions are 
covered by the amendment, but that import transactions are not." HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 10. The Report also states that "the intent of[§ 402] is to establish 
that the proscriptions of the Sherman Act do not apply to export or purely foreign 
commerce unless the conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
anticompetitive effect on domestic or import commerce, or a domestic export oppor-
tunity." ld. at 14. In his explanation of H.R. 5235 on the floor of the House of 
Representatives, Rep. McClory stated that the bill "does not address our domestic 
trade, nor for that matter, our import trade since imports invariably have an impact 
on our domestic trade. Moreover, it was our judgment that imports were doing rather 
well, perhaps too well, and did not need the assistance of this legislation." 128 CoNe. 
REc. H4981-82 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982). 
36. As of late May, 1985, Eurim-Pharm. Gmbh v. Pfizer, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH), 66,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), was the only case found in which§ 402 was applied. 
In this case the plaintiff, a West German distributor of pharmaceutical products, sued 
Pfizer, Inc. and several of its wholly-owned subsidiaries which were engaged in business 
in Europe. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants and others engaged in a price 
fixing and market allocation scheme in Europe in order to maintain the market position 
of one of Pfizer's antibiotics, Vibramycin, after the expiration of certain patents. The 
defendants allegedly sold the drug only to distributors and others who agreed to resell 
only iri specified markets and at specified prices. As a consequence of this scheme, 
Pfizer, Inc. allegedly maintained a substantial share of the world market for the drug. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff ·failed 
to allege the requisite effect on United States import or domestic commerce. The court 
granted this motion. In her opinion the judge noted that international business 
transactions are now governed by § 402 and that this statute requires a showing that 
the alleged anti-competitive conduct has the requisite effect on United States domestic 
or import commerce. She found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the alleged 
price fixing and market sharing scheme in Europe had the prescribed effect here. /d. 
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United States. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 37 the 
foreign aluminum producers imposed a quota on production and 
sale of aluminum, including restraints on imports into the United 
States. The OPEC price agreements referred to in International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries38 clearly affected the price at which 
petroleum products would be sold here. Of course, the tightened 
scrutiny of conduct totally in foreign trade does restrict application 
of the antitrust laws and will probably change the results of some 
cases in which jurisdiction was found to exist under the old 
Sherman Act. 39 
The clarity of both the statutory language and the legislative 
history regarding the distinction between imports and other foreign 
commerce notwithstanding, there is a risk that the parenthetical 
phrase "(other than import trade or import commerce)" will be 
read out of the statut~. It is fairly easy for the eye to skip to 
section 402(1)(A) in which the same words "import trade or 
import commerce'' are used and for one to conclude that the 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable standard set forth 
in that subsection applies also to conduct involving import trade 
or import commerce. 40 When the introductory portion of section 
402 and subsection ( 1) are read together, it is apparent that 
the codified effects standard of subsection ( 1) applies to conduct 
other than that involving import trade or commerce, i.e., to 
conduct involving export or totally foreign trade or commerce, 
that has the requisite effect on domestic trade or import or export 
trade. Section 402( 1 )(A) does not mean that the codified effects 
standard is to be used to review restraints on import trade or 
commerce. The somewhat confusing structure of section 402 and 
the fact that a careful reading of the section results in two separate 
regimes of subject matter jurisdiction, one for imports and one 
for all else, may cause courts to overlook the parenthetical and 
to apply the separate rules of section 402( 1) and (2) to all foreign 
commerce cases. 
While the fact of this dichotomy between imports on the one 
hand and all else on the other may be admitted, the line separating 
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
38. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), alf'd., 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 u.s. 1163 (1981). 
39. See infra notes"41-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent cases, 
the outcome of which might be different if § 402 were applicable. 
40. See B. HAWK, supra note 9, at 22 (Supp.). 
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the two is not bright. On t)1e export and totally foreign commerce 
side, some points seem clear. Totally foreign activities will come 
under the restrictive provisions of section 402( 1) and (2), as will 
conduct in export commerce. Hence, the outcome of recent cases 
such as Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc. 41 and 
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 42 which 
involve essentially foreign activities having very little effect in the 
United States, and Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc. 4:l and 
Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and 
Engineering Co., 44 involving restraints in the export trade of the 
41. 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). The 
defendants, United States corporations, were engaged in the business of carrying cargo 
between Taiwan and South Vietnam. The ultimate purchase of the cargo was financed 
by the Agency for International Development, which conditioned the financing on the 
use of American flag vessels and crews. The plaintiffs were United States companies 
with qualified vessels and crews which attempted to enter this market. The defendants 
excluded the plaintiffs from the shipping conferences and engaged in predatory pricing 
for the purpose of keeping the plaintiffs out of the Taiwan-South Vietnam market. The 
court found that jurisdiction existed under the Sherman Act. Arguably this case does 
not involve totally foreign trade, but rather the export trade in United States merchant 
marine services. See id. at 813; Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 988-89 (discussion of 
Pacific Seafarers). This distinction is not important for § 402 purposes because the same 
standards apply to totally foreign or export commerce. See Shenefield, supra note 9, at 
1119. 
42. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983). In this case, 
plaintiff United States corporation sued defendants, a Japanese corporation, its United 
States subsidiary, and an unrelated Indonesian corporation, claiming that defendants 
conspired to prevent plaintiff from harvesting timber in Borneo and exporting it to the 
United States. Defendants controlled the logging rights and exported all of the timber 
to Japan. This conduct was totally foreign to the United States. However, because of 
it a competitor was prevented from potentially importing timber into the United States. 
The court found that jurisdiction existed under the Sherman Act. 671 F.2d at 884. See 
Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 987-88 (discussion of Industrial Investment). 
43. 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 62,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The plaintiff, a South 
African film library, sued the defendant, a United States exporter of films, for block 
booking of films. The plaintiff was required to pay for films it did not want in order 
to obtain those it desired. The court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion 
made on jurisdictional grounds because the plaintiff had alleged that the tying arrange-
ment had the effect of foreclosing other United States exporters from the South African 
market. !d. at 76,257; see Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 993-94 (discussion of 
Waldbaum). 
44. 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 161,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The plaintiff, the 
developer of an Italian oil refinery, sued the defendant, a United States corporation, 
alleging that the defendant conspired with Exxon's Italian crude oil distributor in 
violation of the Sherman Act. The defendant submitted a higher bid for the engineering 
services required by the refinery than that submitted by a competing United States 
company. In return for accepting this higher bid, the plaintiff wquld receive a favorable 
crude oil supply contract from Exxon's Italian crude oil distributor. The court held 
that jurisdiction existed, finding that the impact on United States commerce was shown 
by the allegation that the trade in the export of design and engineering services was 
restrained. !d. at 70,783-70,785; see Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 993 (discussion of 
Industria Siciliana). 
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United States, may be different if section 402 had been applicable. 
In each of these cases the courts determined that it was appropriate 
to apply the antitrust laws despite a tenuous connection with or 
effect on United States foreign commerce. 45 
b. The Meaning of the "Conduct Involving" 
Requirement of Section 402 of the FT AlA 
As section 402 states, all foreign commerce cases, except import 
cases, will be subject to the more rigorous scrutiny of subsections 
( 1) and (2). The different treatment of import commerce from all 
other foreign commerce is a function of how broadly or narrowly 
the import trade category is construed. To make the distinction, 
courts will contrast the import trade aspects of a particular 
transaction with the totally foreign aspects. 46 To the extent that 
the import trade provision is broadly construed, conduct otherwise 
thought to be totally foreign, and thus subject to the more rigorous 
scrutiny of section 402(1) and (2), will be excluded from this 
scrutiny, and vice versa. 
The language of section 402 allows this elasticity in the inter-
pretation of the import trade provision. The introductory portion 
of section 402 provides that " [ s ]ection 1-7 of this title shall not 
apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import 
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless .... '' 47 
The use of the words "conduct involving" as applied to the 
subject matter jurisdictional inquiry represents a change from 
prior law; 48 it is the other significant ma,tter raised by the first of 
section 402 's three substantive changes to the Sherman Act. 
45. See Shenefield, supra note 9, at 1119. The House Report noted that the statute 
would probably change the result of the Pacific Seafarers case because of the totally 
foreign character of the restraint. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9-10. The Report 
notes the Waldbaum and Industria Siciliana cases in connection with its discussion of the 
various formulations of the effects test. /d. at 5. 
46. The contrast will more likely be between the import aspects and the totally 
foreign, rather than between the import and export aspects, because most often the 
particular restraint will not include both exports and imports. But see notes 94-96 and 
accompanying text (discussion of restraints involving both imports and exports). Also, 
it would be rather difficult to interpret the facts of an import restraint as a restraint 
on exports and vice versa. 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)(emphasis added). For an application of this same concept 
to export commerce, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
48. See Fugate, The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws: The Old Webb-Pomerene 
Act and the New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 705 (1982). 
For example, in each of the four cases mentioned in notes 41-44 and accompanying 
text, jurisdiction was found because of some effect on United States export or import 
commerce, not because there was "conduct involving imports or exports." 
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The legislative history provides little guidance as to the contours 
of the "conduct involving" concept. It would appear, however, 
that the developed rationales used to support Sherman Act subject 
matter jurisdiction in the interstate commerce setting could provide 
a useful means for analyzing some of the dimensions of the 
"conduct involving" requirement. In the interstate commerce 
setting, the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act is said 
to encompass conduct either in the flow of interstate commerce 
or conduct affecting interstate commerce. 49 The latter includes 
conduct of intrastate nature having an effect on interstate com-
merce. 50 It is generally agreed that the foreign commerce clause 
of the old Sherman Act was approached in the same manner. 
The subject matter jurisdiction of the foreign commerce clause 
embraced both conduct in the flow of foreign commerce and 
conduct affecting foreign commerce. 51 The cases in the foreign 
commerce setting do not appear to dwell on the distinction. United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America and the many cases applying its 
effects test, 52 concentrate on whether the conduct has the requisite 
effect in the United States or on United States commerce. Judge 
Hand in Alcoa did not consider whether subject matter jurisdiction 
existed because the restraints were on the flow of foreign com-
49. See I P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAws ,, 232-233 (1978); L. 
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 708-12 (1977); 16j. VoN KALINOWSKI, 
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 4.03 (1985). 
50. In McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980), 
petitioner sued respondents, who were real estate brokers, and their trade association 
transacting business in the greater New Orleans area, alleging that respondents' 
adherence to a fixed rate of brokerage commissions constituted a conspiracy to fix 
prices. Petitioners argued that the respondents activities were in the flow of interstate 
commerce because they assisted their clients in obtaining financing and title insurance 
for the purchase of residential real estate from sources outside Lousiana. Respondents 
moved to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, contending that their activities 
were local in nature and did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The district 
court dismissed the complaint on the basis of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773 (1975). The dismissal was affirmed by the circuit court. The Supreme Court noted 
the breadth of Sherman Act jurisdiction under the "in the flow of' or "effect on" 
interstate commerce theories. The Court reversed the lower court, holding that to 
establish jurisdiction the plaintiff must allege, and if controverted prove, either that the 
defendant's conduct was itself in interstate commerce or, "if it is local in nature, that 
it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce." 
McLain, 444 U.S. at 242. 
51. See I W. FuGATE, supra note 29, § 2.17; I E. KINTNER, supra note 29, § 7.4; 
L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 49, at 714-15; 16 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 49, § 5.01; 
Fugate, supra note 48, at 705; Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 523. 
52. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see 
also infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for cases applying the Alcoa effects test. 
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merce. He looked for an intended and actual effect in the United 
States. 53 Nevertheless, the conduct in the flow of commerce and 
conduct affecting commerce theories present useful devices with 
which to analyze the ''conduct involving'' concept. 
Preliminarily it should be recognized that the parenthetical 
language "(other than import trade and import commerce)" is 
ambiguously positioned in the introductory sentence. Because the 
words "conduct involving" do not appear within the parenthetical, 
it is possible to construe the introductory portion of section 402 
very broadly to mean that the Sherman Act does not apply. to 
conduct involving foreign commerce, other than to anything relating 
to import trade or commerce, unless the requirements of subsec-
tions ( 1) and (2) are met. This construction is too broad and is 
unwarranted. The parenthetical is linked to the "conduct involv-
ing" concept. Hence, the introductory portion of section 402 
should be construed to mean that the Sherman Act is inapplicable 
to conduct involving foreign commerce, other than to conduc·t 
involving import trade or commerce, unless the provisions of 
subsections ( 1) and (2) are met. 
This reading leads directly to the question of what ''conduct 
involving'' means. It could mean only conduct or restrictive 
practices which are themselves in import trade or commerce, such 
as price fixing, tie-in, or reciprocal purchase agreements or market 
divisions made and implemented with respect to products or 
services being imported into the United States. Or it could in-
clude even local conduct or activities affecting the import com-
merce of the United States. If so, it is unclear whether the 
effect must be directly on import commerce or whether local 
conduct that impacts upon an enterprise engaged in import 
commerce is sufficient. If the "conduct involving" requirement 
is interpreted more broadly to include restraints affecting import 
commerce, as well as those in import commerce, conduct that 
53. Alcoa, 148 F. 2d at 444. There may be less reason to dwell on the distinction in 
the foreign commerce setting. The constitutional issues inherent in the interstate 
commerce clause and the resulting need to distinguish interstate from intrastate 
commerce are not present in the foreign commerce setting. This is especially so if the 
conduct in question occurred outside the United States. When the facts show conduct 
within the United States which is alleged to affect foreign commerce, the distinction 
between intrastate and foreign commerce raises the same constitutional issues~ For a 
discussion of the applicability of § 402 to conduct within the United States having an 
effect on export commerce, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise might be considered totally foreign54 might be. brought 
into the import commerce side of the dichotomy. 
The "conduct involving" requirement raises several related 
issues. It is unclear whether the requirement includes only re-
straints actually or presently affecting import commerce or if it 
includes conduct having a potential effect on imports as well. 
Also, is there a quantum threshold which must be met before the 
activity is deemed to be "conduct involving" import commerce? 
The facts of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America55 can be 
used to consider these questions and to apply an analysis using 
the flow of commerce and affecting commerce theories. In this 
case, Timberlane attempted to establish a lumber operation in 
Honduras by purchasing the assets of a bankrupt company located 
there. The lumber was to be imported into the United States. 
The defendants included the principals of lumber companies 
engaged in business in Honduras, their financial supporter, Bank 
of America, and its employees. The defendants allegedly conspired 
to prevent Timberlane from operating its business, thereby pre-
serving control of the Honduran lumber export business in the 
hands of interests tied to the Bank of America. Timberlane alleged 
numerous acts of the defendants in furtherance of this conspiracy. 
The defendants refused to settle the debts of Timberlane's bank-
rupt predecessor, which Timberlane had assumed and offered to 
settle; instead, they used a provision in the law of Honduras to 
obtain a court order embargoing Timberlane's business. In ad-
dition, the defendants caused the arrest of the manager of Tim-
berlane's Honduras operations and published defamatory articles 
regarding Timberlane. 56 
Timberlane alleged that this conduct violated sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act as well as the Wilson Tariff ActY The district 
court dismissed the complaint on act of state grounds and also 
because these activities had no direct and substantial effect on 
foreign commerce. 58 The circuit court, in the now well-known 
54. Conduct within the United States which affects import commerce could also be 
conduct involving import commerce under this broader variant. See infra notes 134-40 
and accompanying text. 
55. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
56. !d. at 604-05; see 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, §§ 6.10-.14. The 
authors note the similarity of these facts to those of American Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1982). 
58. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601. 
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opinion of J u.dge Choy, 59 vacated the dismissal and remanded the 
case. This opinion set forth a tripartite analysis for determining 
whether it is appropriate for a court to exercise jurisdiction to 
review under the antitrust laws conduct engaged in outside the 
United States. 60 
Much of the defendants' conduct in this case was of a local 
nature, confined to activities in Honduras, but was intended to 
affect, and apparently did affect, the business of an importer into 
the United States. 61 A court today considering a complaint alleging 
these facts as a basis of a cause of action for violation of the 
Sherman Act must determine whether, by reason of section 402, 
the Sherman Act is applicable. To assist in this determination the 
court might adapt the in the flow of or affecting commerce theories 
59. See, e.g, Gill, Two Cheers for Timberlane, 10 REVIEW SuiSSE ou DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL DE LA CoNCURRENCE 3 ( 1980); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos": Constructing a 
Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 
733 (1977); Note, Sherman Act jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1247 (1977); Recent Developments, 18 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 701 (1977). 
60. The circuit court instructed the district court to consider whether it was 
appropriate to assume jurisdiction over the case according to a three-part test. The test 
requires a determination: (i) that there has been some effect, actual or intended, on 
United States foreign commerce; (ii) that there has been a burden or restraint sufficient 
to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and consequently a violation of the 
antitrust laws; (iii) that the interests of, and links to, the United States, including the 
magnitude of effect on United States foreign commerce, are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis 
those of other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority. Timberlane, 
549 F.2d at 613. 
On remand, the district court applied this analysis and granted defendants' motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On the first element, it found an 
effect on United States commerce, although it was one barely above de minimus. On 
the third element, it found the balance to be in favor of Honduras. On the second, it 
found that Timberlane did not have standing because it suffered no corporate injury. 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), alf'd, 
749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). This opinion on remand contains a more complete 
statement of facts than was available from the record on which Judge Choy's statement 
of facts was prepared. The district court on remand, when performing the balancing 
of interest analysis, employed all of the seven elements Judge.Choy considered relevant. 
See infra note 156 (factors to be considered). The circuit court, in reviewing the district 
court judgment, made its own determination as to each of these elements. In its 
assessment, the interests in five of the seven indicated that jurisdiction ought not be 
exercised. The circuit court concluded that although there was some effect on United 
States commerce, it was insubstantial, and that enforcement of the antitrust laws would 
lead to a significant conflict with Honduran law and policy. Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 
1384-86; see Messen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. 
lNT'L L. 783 (1984). 
61. It is unclear from the facts of Timberlane whether such conduct actually affected 
the import commerce of the United States. The facts as developed on remand show 
that Honduran lumber imported into the United States constituted only a miniscule 
portion of the United States lumber market. 749 F.2d at 1385. 
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from the interstate commerce setting, modifying them slightly so 
that they would apply to import commerce. 
A court could thus inquire whether the conduct is in the flow 
of import commerce or whether it affects import commerce. In 
this foreign commerce setting a two step analysis would be required 
whereas, in the interstate commerce setting, only one step is 
required. In an interstate commerce case, if the court determines 
that the conduct is either in the flow of or affects interstate 
commerce, subject matter jurisdiction attaches. In the foreign 
commerce setting, the suggested in the flow of or affects import 
commerce tests are not subject matter jurisdiction tests. These 
tests, or whatever standards a court uses to determine whether 
the activities constitute "conduct involving" import commerce, 
are instead preliminary tests indicating which subject matter 
jurisdiction test is applicable. If a court following this approach 
determines that the conduct is neither in the flow of nor affects 
import commerce, it would then review the facts under the more 
rigorous standard of section 402( 1) and (2). Alternatively, if the 
court determines that the conduct involves import commerce, 
because it is either in the flow of or affects import commerce, 
the court would apply one of the myriad effects tests62 to determine 
if it could exercise subject matter jurisdiction. The answer to this 
preliminary question would probably dictate, however, the answer 
to the subject matter question, especially if the conduct is consid-
ered to affect import commerce. 
Under the narrower flow of import commerce approach, the 
conduct in the Timberlane case probably would not be considered 
conduct involving imports because of its local character. Conse-
quently, Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction would exist only 
if the more rigorous requirements of section 402(1) and (2) were 
met. If the reviewing court were to apply the broader affects 
import commerce rationale, the facts might be deemed to fit 
within the "conduct involving" import commerce exceptionY 
62. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects 
tests. 
63. On the facts of Timberlane, if the defendants were previously exporting their 
timber to the United States, it may be more difficult to demonstrate that the conduct 
meets even the affects imports test. The defendants' conduct in Honduras prevented 
Timberlane from participating in the Honduran timber export business. It is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that there was an effect on a participant in import commerce. 
Rather, it must be shown that the defendant's conduct has the requisite effect on 
import commerce. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, § 6.08; Rahl, 
American Antitrust, supra note 30, at 6. If the defendants already were exporting from 
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The legislative history of the FT AlA does not address the 
"conduct involving" question. It offers no guidance as to whether 
the suggested in the flow of or affects import commerce analysis 
is appropriate. The ETCA and the FTAIA are primarily designed 
to free United States exporters from overly rigorous applications 
of the antitrust laws. 64 Yet, at the same time, there is a recognition 
that conduct affecting imports may adversely affect United States 
consumers, and consequently the laws must be applied more 
stringently in such cases. 65 Because United States consumers could 
be injured as much by local conduct clearly affecting imports as 
by conduct directly in import commerce, there is some basis for 
adopting the broader interpretation. 
Yet to do so may raise the spectre of excessive application of 
the Sherman Act. This in turn provides the incentive for a 
narrower interpretation. On the facts of Timberlane, the conduct 
in qu€stion took place in a foreign country and was engaged in 
partially by nationals of that state. A narrow construction of the 
"conduct involving" requirement would avoid the potential em-
barrassment of applying United States law in such a situation. 
Using the broader affects import commerce approach in the 
"conduct involving" inquiry, but tempering its application with 
the balancing of state interest analysis suggested by Timberlane, 66 
would likewise avoid potential embarrassment. Because of the 
dichotomy of foreign commerce in the introductory portion of 
section 402, a broad interpretation of "conduct involving" import 
commerce narrows correspondingly the application of section 402 's 
more rigorous scrutiny. There may be an incentive to narrowly 
construe the "conduct involving" element in order to give the 
Honduras and into the United States, arguably Timberlane's absence, though caused 
by defendants, did not affect imports. In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & 
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a.ff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 950 ( 1972), the defendant unsuccessfully made a similar argument. This case 
involved a dispute over certain oil concession rights. The defendant argued that there 
was no effect on United States commerce because it, like the plaintiff, intended to 
import the oil into the United States. Accordingly, there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction because the affecting foreign commerce element was lacking. The court 
rejected this argument, noting that "[w]hen control of an item in commerce is wrested 
from one competitor to another, the commerce of the article is to that extent 'affected' 
regardless of the ultimate disposition of the commodity." 331 F.Supp. at 103 n.5. This 
language equates an effect on a competitor with an effect on competition. 
64. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
legislative history of the FTAIA. 
65. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9. 
66. For a discussion of the balancing of state interest analysis employed by the 
Timberlane courts, see supra note 60 . 
798 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
participants the advantage of section 402 when the activities in 
question involve American participants. However, the legislative 
history demonstrates a desire to assist only the export activities 
of American companies. 67 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving Sherman Act 
subject matter jurisdiction under the interstate commerce clause 
suggest a basis for arguing that the broader affecting import 
commerce approach is an appropriate interpretation of the "con-
duct involving'' element. The affecting interstate commerce theory 
evolved to avoid the rigidity of the in the flow of commerce 
requirement and to thereby better effect the purpose of the 
Sherman Act. 68 The same could be said of the affecting import 
commerce rationale. There have been numerous Supreme Court 
opinions dealing with this issue. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees 
of Rex Hospital69 is one of the recent ones. 70 
The facts in Hospital Building Co. are similar to those in 
Timberlane. Petitioner and respondent were corporations engaged 
in the business of operating hospitals in Raleigh, North Carolina. 
Petitioner intended to move and expand its facility. The complaint 
alleged that respondent Trustees, several individual respondents, 
and others conspired to block this relocation. Respondents alleg-
edly conspired to delay and, if possible, block the issuance of the 
necessary state authorization for the planned expansion. After the 
authorization was received, respondents continued their obstruc-
tionist activity by such tactics as the institution of frivolous 
litigation and publication of adverse information regarding the 
expansion. 
Petitioners alleged that these actions were taken to restrain and 
monopolize the trade in hospital service in the Raleigh area in 
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Petitioner 
identified several aspects of interstate commerce adversely effected 
by respondents' anticompetitive conduct, including the percentage 
67. In this regard Rep. McClory's statement to the effect that imports do not 
require the aid of the more rigorous rules of § 402 is pertinent. See supra note 35 
(further discussion of House Report and Rep. McClory's statement regarding FTAIA). 
68. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 49, , 232; L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 
49, at 708-14. 
69. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). 
70. See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving 
Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Mandeville Island 
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). See generally 1 W. FuGATE, 
supra note 29, § 2.9. 
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of its supplies purchased from out-of-state sources, the number 
of patients coming from other states, the proportion of petitioner's 
revenue coming from out-of-state insurance companies and gov-
ernmental agencies, the amount of the management fee based on 
revenues paid to its parent, an out-of-state corporation, and the 
amount of the financing for the expansion expected from out-of-
state lenders. 71 
The district court dismissed the complaint in part because 
petitioner failed to state the requisite effect on interstate com-
merce. 72 The circuit court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 
allegations were inadequate to support a conclusion that the 
conduct was either in or would have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. 73 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that 
the interstate commerce nexus for Sherman Act jurisdiction can 
be met by wholly local restraints which substantially and adversely 
affect interstate commerce. The Court explained that if interstate 
commerce "feels the pinch it does not matter how local the 
operation which applies the squeeze.' ' 74 The Court reviewed the 
allegations in the complaint and determined that if respondents 
succeeded in blocking the hospital, petitioner's volume of out-of-
state supply purchases, revenues, and management fees would be 
different than if the expansion were completed, and that the out-
of-state financing would not be used at all if completion of the 
hospital was blocked. The Court concluded that this combination 
of factors established a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 75 
The circuit court had based its affirmance of the dismissal in part 
on the indirect effect on interstate commerce presented by the 
facts, finding that the effect was merely a consequence of the 
intrastate restraint in the Raleigh area. 76 The Supreme Court 
concluded that conduct not directed at interstate commerce can 
be deemed to affect interstate commerce if it alters substantial 
patterns of interstate commerce. 77 
71. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 739-41 
( 1976). 
72. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 511 F. 2d 678, 680 (4th 
Cir. 1975)(en bane). 
73. /d. at 684. 
74. Hospital Building Co., 425 U.S. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copps Paving 
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); United States v. Womens' Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 
460, 464 (1949)). 
75. /d. at 744. 
76. Hospital Building Co., 511 F.2d at 684. 
77. Hospital Building Co., 425 U.S. at 744. The Supreme Court in McLain v. Real 
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Following this reasoning, it could be argued that even fairly 
local conduct directed at a participant in the market could be 
deemed to be conduct affecting import commerce and thereby 
"conduct involving" import commerce. If, because of the defend-
ant's activities, the import commerce aspects of a plaintiffs 
business are different than they would be otherwise, and these 
aspects are substantial, then on the rationale of Hospital Building 
Co., the defendant's conduct would be "conduct involving" import 
commerce. 
Likewise, by analogy to Hospital Building Co., a plaintiff probably 
ought not be required to demonstrate, as part of the "conduct 
involving'' inquiry, that a defendant intended to affect import 
commerce. 78 The circuit court's view of the facts in that case led 
it to conclude that the conspiracy did not have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce because the conduct was directed at 
intrastate commerce. 79 The Supreme Court specifically found that 
conclusion unwarranted. It held that purpose or intent to affect 
interstate commerce is not necessary. It is sufficient, according to 
the Court, to demonstrate that the conduct impacts on a business 
activity which has substantial interstate commerce aspects. 80 
Also, a plaintiff probably need not demonstrate that a defend-
ant's conduct had an actual effect on import commerce. It should 
be sufficient to show that the import commerce aspects surrounding 
a plaintiffs business would be different, and substantially so, in 
the absence of a defendant's anti-competitive conduct. Cases in 
the past have entertained Sherman Act jurisdiction on the basis 
of potential effects on foreign commerce. 81 The Supreme Court 
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980), applied the same approach and 
relied in part on Hospital Building Co. to support its finding that the fixed commissions 
there in question constituted a restraint affecting interstate commerce. The facts of this 
case are stated in note 50, supra. Professor Rahl, in presenting his thesis that the 
Sherman Act covers all conduct occurring in the course of foreign commerce, makes 
this same point. He notes that the effect need not be adverse in the sense that the 
volume of commerce must be reduced. He believes that the commerce must "in some 
way be distorted from the path it would take if competition were not illegally interfered 
with.'' Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 524. 
78. The facts of Timberlane do evidence some intent. Defendants ·in that case 
attempted to keep Timberlane out of the market of exporting timber out of Honduras 
and into the United States. Likewise, probably in most cases an intent to affect plaintiffs 
import business could be shown. 
79. Hospital Building Co., 511 F. 2d at 684. 
80. Hospital Building Co., 425 U.S. at 745. 
81. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 ( 1983); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil 
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), ajj'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 
1949). See 1 J. ATwooD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, § 6.08. 
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cases, by analogy, support a continuation of that approach. In 
Hospital Building Co., the defendant's conduct resulted in a dis-
tortion of the future course of interstate commerce. Because of 
this conduct the out-of-state financing would not be required, 
there would be no expansion and, hence, no increase in purchases 
of supplies, billings to insurance carriers, or patients from out-
of-state.82 
More importantly, the distinction between actual and potential 
effects on commerce is vague in this context. In many instances 
a defendant's conduct has aspects of both. In Hospital Building Co. 
the present, actual effect of the defendants' conduct was to prevent 
a change in the interstate aspects of the plaintiffs business. Had 
it not been for the defendants' activities, the expansion of the 
hospital would have taken place; this would have resulted in the 
changes in volume and types of interstate commerce stated by 
plaintiff. Likewise, in Timberlane the present effect of the defend-
ants' conduct was to prevent Timberlane from engaging in 
business in Honduras. The present effect distorted import com-
merce from what it might have been otherwise. 
It does appear that a certain quantum of impact on import 
commerce would be required under the conduct affecting import 
commerce variant of "conduct involving." This issue was never 
clearly resolved under the old Sherman Act. There is support for 
the proposition that the quantum of effect on foreign commerce 
is irrelevant to the subject matter jurisdiction issue and goes only 
to the reasonableness of the conduct. 83 Some cases have formulated 
the Alcoa effects test to authorize jurisdiction when there is any 
effect on foreign commerce beyond a purely de minimus one. 84 
However, the more usual formulation of the Alcoa effects test is 
that there must be at least a "substantial" or "appreciable" effect 
on foreign commerce. 85 
82. Hospital Building Co., 425 U.S. at 744. This opinion merely reviews the adequacy 
of the pleadings. The opinion does not pass on the sufficiency of the proofs of effect 
on interstate commerce. The case was remanded, and was tried. Plaintiff Hospital 
Building Company was awarded a treble damage judgment at trial, which was reversed 
on appeal. The jurisdictional issue was not raised on appeal. 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 
1982). 
83. See, e.g., 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 29, § 7.4; L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 49, at 
710 & 714. 
84. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 483 F. 
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 383 
F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
85. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d 
Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
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The line of Supreme Court cases from the interstate commerce 
setting clearly requires that the effect be substantial to support 
jurisdiction under the affects commerce rationale. 86 This require-
ment does force courts to engage in line-drawing with respect to 
degrees or quantum of effects. This same difficulty would attend 
use of the effect on import commerce rationale. In an attempt to 
ease this burden, the Supreme Court has been willing to consider 
the issue of substantiality in a practical economic sense rather 
than only as a matter of assessing dollar volume or percentages. 87 
If a substantial effect on import commerce requirement is read 
into the affecting import commerce variant of "conduct involv-
ing," one element of the section 402( 1) codified effects standard-
substantial effect-would also be used in the "conduct involving" 
determination. In the interstate commerce setting the substantial 
effect element for subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied if the 
restraint affects a substantial amount of interstate commerce; the 
restraint itself need not be substantial. 88 In the foreign commerce 
setting, however, the substantial effects standard generally has 
required that the restrictive practice itself have a substantial 
effect. 89 To the extent that there is a meaningful distinction 
between the two, the foreign commerce version of substantial 
effects should be used for the "conduct involving" inquiry. It 
86. See, e.g., Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 511 F.2d 678 
(1975); Rassmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 950 (1973); see 16 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 49, § 4.03. 
87. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 745 
(1975); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 n.11 (1975); United States 
v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). 
88. In McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., the Supreme Court noted 
that it was sufficient for petitioners "to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce generated by the real estate agents' brokerage activity." 444 U.S. 232, 241-
42 (1980). It was not necessary for petitioners to show that the conspiracy to_fix real 
estate commissions itself had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See 1 W. 
FuGATE, supra note 29, § 2.9; see also Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 
425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975); 
L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 49, at 710. 
89. See, e.g., Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the 
Antitrust Laws 76 (1955)("We feel that the Sherman Act applies only to those 
arrangements ... which have such substantial anti-competitive effects on this country's 
trade or commerce ... with foreign nations as to constitute unreasonable restraints.");· 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; B. HAWK, supra note 9, at 35-39. Professor 
Rahl's thesis that the Sherman Act applies to conduct in or having a substantial effect 
on commerce (see infra notes 91 and 136) would support a broader reading of the 
substantial effect requirement, comparable to the approach in the interstate commerce 
cases. 
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would be confusing to use both versions, one for "conduct 
involving'' purposes and the other for the effects test. Ultimately 
the foreign commerce version would be used either as part of the 
codified effects standard for export or totally foreign conduct or 
under many versions of the Alcoa standard for import cases. 
It is less clear whether a substantial effect on import commerce 
would be required under the conduct in the flow of import 
commerce variant. Anticompetitive conduct in the flow of inter-
state commerce triggers Sherman Act jurisdiction without a need 
to demonstrate any effect on interstate commerce. Such conduct, 
because it is in commerce, must affect commerce. 90 Similarly, 
conduct in the flow of import commerce could be considered 
"conduct involving" import commerce without a showing of 
effect. 91 The analogy to the interstate commerce cases may not 
be apt here. The in the flow of interstate commerce analysis is 
the subject matter test. The "conduct involving" inquiry is a 
preliminary one, designed to determine the applicable subject 
matter test. Because a showing of at least some, but usually a 
substantial, effect will be required under the various subject matter 
jurisdiction tests, there is reason to require the same showing at 
the preliminary "conduct involving" inquiry. By so doing the 
futile exercise of determining that the cor1duct is "conduct in-
volving'' import commerce, and then that the quantum of effect 
on United States commerce is not sufficient to support jurisdiction, 
will be avoided. 
The parameters of the ''conduct involving'' exception to section 
402 are uncertain at this point. Certainly this concept will include 
anti-competitive conduct in import commerce, such as market 
divisions or price fixing with respect to goods or services being 
imported. It probably also will include local conduct engaged in 
for the purpose of affecting imports. If interpreted more broadly 
it also could include local conduct directly impacting upon import 
commerce. 
Extending the concept to this last type of activity clearly requires 
careful line drawing by the courts. For example, if a domestic 
competitor of Timberlane engaged in an anticompetitive practice 
90. See L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 49, at 708 (discussion of meaning of commerce). 
91. Professor Rahl argues, analogously to the interstate commerce cases, that if the 
conduct occurs as part of a transaction itself in export or foreign commerce there is no 
need to prove effect. The substantial and direct effect elements in the jurisdictional 
inquiry are relevant only in those cases in which the conduct is not in the flow of, but 
affects, foreign trade. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 523. 
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in this country directed at Timberlane's business here, that practice 
might reduce Timberlane's profitability. A less profitable Tim-
berlane may be a less viable competitor in the import sector 
because its volume of imports could be curtailed or the price of 
its products could be higher. Consequently, the domestic anticom-
petitive practice may have some impact on import commerce. 
This conduct should not be construed to fall within the "conduct 
involving" import concept. However, the defendants' conduct as 
stated in the Timberlane opinion92 was clearly directed at Timber-
lane's import business, even though local in character. The conduct 
could, under a broad reading of conduct affecting import com-
merce, fit within the "conduct involving" concept. Extension of 
the concept to cover conduct like that described in Timberlane or 
Hospital Building Co. is not too strained an expansion. The 
defendants in those cases reasonably should have recognized that 
one consequence of their activities would be to adversely affect 
plaintiffs import business. Such an expansion has the advantage 
of not · limiting section 402 to conduct in the flow of import 
commerce and to those cases in which the plaintiff can meet the 
difficult burden of proving that the defendant intended to affect 
imports. 93 
Section 402's narrowing of the ambit of Sherman Act applic-
ability by creating an import or all else dichotomy, raises other 
ISSUeS. 
Restraints can involve both imports and exports. For example, 
if United States and foreign producers agreed upon a world-wide 
market division, allocating the United States market to the United 
States companies in exchange for their forbearance in certain 
foreign markets, the arrangement would affect both imports and 
exports. Presumably an agreement among the United States 
participants to allocate only foreign markets would affect only 
exports and thus would be analyzed under the separate rules of 
section 402(1) and (2). A competitor of the participants to this 
92. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for the facts of Timberlane. 
93. The difficulty in proving intent has led courts to employ the "general intent" 
concept whereby intent is proven from conduct. See infra note 113 and accompanying 
text (courts employing general intent). Under this rationale the conduct in Timberlane 
could be said to prove intent to affect imports. If courts are not free to examine the 
conduct, and deduce from it a motive, the "conduct involving" concept would be 
limited to conduct in the flow of import commerce, and perhaps to cases of specific 
intent to affect imports. If, alternatively, they are free to examine conduct, they ought 
to be able to do so both for the purpose of divining intent and to take into account 
the factual consequences of the conduct, its impact on import commerce. 
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latter export allocation could recover only if it could prove injury 
to its United States businesses. 94 A world wide market allocation, 
however, may keep prices high in the United States and elsewhere. 
Because the arrangement would affect prices of goods sold in the 
United States, it would affect imports. This arrangement would 
resemble a classic international territorial cartel. The legislative 
history of the FT AlA contains some consideration of this type of 
an arrangement. Concern was expressed that the proposed leg-
islation, which became section 402, would sanction participation 
in such an arrangement by United States companies. 95 The House 
Judiciary Committee considered this point and resolved it prag-
matically by concluding that such cartels would likely have the 
effect here required by the codified effects standard. Instead of 
determining whether such arrangements are to be governed by 
import or export standards, Congress concluded that the effects 
of such cartels would violate the export commerce standard. 96 
Obviously, this conclusion supports the interpretation that such 
conduct is governed by section 402. 
c. The Second Revision: The Articulation of 
a Statutory Standard for Determining the 
Jurisdictional Reach of the Sherman Act 
As codified in section 402( 1), the Sherman Act shall not apply 
to conduct involving trade with foreign nations, other than import 
trade, unless such conduct "has a direct, substantial and reason-
ably foreseeable effect" 97 on either domestic trade, 98 import trade, 
or the export trade of a person engaged in such trade in the 
United States. 
This codification of a jurisdictional standard fulfills the second 
purpose of the FT AlA. 99 The codification presents businesspeople 
94. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. 
95. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 46. 
96. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13. Professor Hawk contends that cartels 
having an effect on United States import or domestic commerce would be excluded 
from the FTAIA. B. HAwK, supra note 9, at 22 (Supp.). For a discussion of whether 
§ 402 takes precedence over domestic standards for conduct having an effect on interstate 
and export commerce, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A) & (B) (1982). 
98. The phrase in § 402(1)(A) "on trade or commerce which is not trade or 
commerce with foreign nations" must refer to domestic commerce. /d. § 6a(1 )(A). 
Although this language is somewhat indirect, it is accurate. So long as the effect is on 
some category of trade which is not foreign trade, that is domestic interstate or intrastate 
trade, this portion of the test is met. See Fugate, supra note 48, at 705. 
99. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
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and attorneys with an explicit standard against which to assess 
whether certain conduct will trigger application of the Sherman 
Act. Such certainty previously has existed as a practical matter 
with respect to the public enforcement of the antitrust laws by 
the Justice Department. In the 1977 Guides for International 
Operations, the Justice Department clearly stated that the antitrust 
laws should be applied to overseas transactions when there is a 
"substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce." 100 
Although it recognized that this enforcement guide could be relied 
on, Congress was concerned with private enforcement. It believed 
that the various formulations of the jurisdictional standard made 
planning problematic. 101 Judge Hand's intent, coupled with some 
effect on United States commerce standard, as articulated in 
Alcoa, 102 has been reformulated in myriad ways. Among other 
variants, it has become an effects only test, 103 a direct or substantial 
effects test, 104 a direct and substantial effects test, 105 and a some 
effects, regardless of whether they are intended or substantial, 
test. 106 Accordingly, some legislative guidance seemed appropriate. 
Congress did not believe that the codified standard represented 
a significant departure from the law as articulated in the cases 
100. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Guide for International 
Operations 6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Guide); see Griffin, A Critique of the 
Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORN. INT'L L.J. 215 
( 1978). 
101. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6 & 9. 
102. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
103. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 
F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 395 
u.s. 922 (1969). 
104. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 
(C.D. Cal. 1971), a.ff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). 
105. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 
1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. General Elec. 
Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 
83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), ajj'd & modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
106. See National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 
1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For a fairly 
complete listing of the variant forms of the jurisdictional standard, see 1981 Hearings, 
supra note 6, at 224-27 (Statement of American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust 
Law); see also HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5; 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra 
note 3, §§ 6.07-.08; 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 29, § 7 .4. 
Because the cases do not assess the facts against several variations of the standard, 
it is uncertain whether these different formulations contribute to different results; that 
is, whether jurisdiction would be found if a vaguer standard were employed. See 1 E. 
KINTNER, supra note 29, § 7.4. (concluding that they do not); 1981 Hearings, supra note 
29, at 227 (Statement of American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law)(same). 
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and the Antitrust Guide. Instead, the House Report described 
the standard as a clarification of existing law and practice. 107 The 
codified standard combines the elements previously used into an 
inclusive test, consisting of three separate elements: the effect 
must be direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable. 108 
Because the standard consists of three separate elements, rea-
sonable foreseeability would probably be satisfied by proof of the 
reasonable foreseeability of any effect of the conduct on the listed 
categories of commerce. Proof that the direct and substantial 
consequences of the conduct were reasonably foreseeable probably 
is not required. There is little explication of the direct 109 and 
substantial elements of the standard in the legislative history. The 
prior case law continues to be applicable in their interpretation. 
The reasonable foreseeability element is discussed in some detail 
in the legislative history. The intent standard was not used because 
of its inherent subjectivity and focus on assessment of motive. 110 
Instead, because of these perceived defects in the intent standard, 
the legislation employs what was thought to be a more objective 
standard. 111 It is somewhat difficult then to accept the conclusion 
that this codified standard is a mere clarification of past law. 
Whether, as a practical matter, application of the new standard 
will result in cases being decided differently than they would have 
been under the intent element remains to be seen. Conceptually 
the two are quite different. 
The House Report describes the reasonably foreseeable element 
as a variant of the reasonable person standard. ''The test is 
whether the effects would have been evident to a reasonable person 
making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowl-
edge or intent can be shown." 112 The difficult burden of proof in 
the subjective intent test has led some courts to employ the general 
intent principle. Under this standard, intent can be proven from 
107. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2-3. Some commentators also believe that the 
§ 402 standard represents little if any change from prior law and practice. See B. HAWK, 
supra note 9, at 22 (Supp.); Shenefield, supra note 9, at 1119. 
108. Hence, conduct having a direct and very substantial effect on United States 
commerce, but somehow not a reasonably foreseeable effect, would not trigger application 
of the Sherman Act under this standard.· 
109. For a discussion of the direct effect element, see Golden & Kolb, supra note 9, 
at 784; Swan, supra note 9, at 212-13. 
110. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9. 
111. Id. at 2. 
112. /d. at 9. 
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conduct because one naturally intends the consequences following 
from conduct. 113 
The reasonable foreseeability test of section 402( 1) is somewhere 
between the general intent test and the specific intent standard, 
but more toward the latter. The reasonable foreseeability test is 
not a superfluous element in the standard. Proof of direct and 
substantial effect would not prove reasonable foreseeability, as 
they would intent under the general intent principle. Perhaps this 
is an additional advantage to the reasonable foreseeability for-
mulation. The concept of reasonable foreseeability gets at some-
thing different from intent. The direct and substantial elements 
do not so immediately relate to it as they do to intent. Therefore, 
proof of the first two elements is less likely to be deemed to satisfy 
the third. 
Undoubtedly, however, proof of the direct and substantial 
consequence of the practice will be used to inform the reasonable 
foreseeability element. The more direct and substantial the effect, 
the more likely that the reasonable person would have foreseen 
it. Nevertheless, proof of actual intent to affect United States 
commerce is not required under this element. Instead it is sufficient 
for a plaintiff to show that the reasonable person exercising 
practical business judgment would have realized that the conduct 
would have an effect on United States commerce. 
Although Congress believed that the reasonable foreseeability 
element would simplify the standard and make it more certain, 
this change is not without cost. The reasonable foreseeability 
element, by Congress's own interpretation, is an adaptation of 
the familiar tort and corporate law reasonable person standard. 
It is likely that use of this element has added a different variable 
into the jurisdictional question. The same subjectivity and difficult 
burden of proof aspects of the intent standard may have been its 
advantage. Because of these factors, a successful jurisdictional 
challenge, based on lack of intent, may have been less likely. 114 
113. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 
949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 
407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 
. 395 U.S. 922 (1969). See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, at §§ 
6.07-.08. 
114. In Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court concluded that an allegation of conspiracy to restrain United 
States trade should satisfy the intent requirement at the pleading stage, because an 
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Intent would be easy to prove, especially under the general intent 
principle. The reasonable foreseeability element, because of its 
familiarity, may provide defendants with a more fertile ground 
on which to challenge jurisdiction. 115 
The reasonable foreseeability element makes the time of meas-
urement critical. Assume that a defendant engages in an anticom-
petitive practice having a direct· and substantial, but initially 
unforeseeable, effect, and that the practice continues for some 
period of time. After several months, as evidence of the conse-
quences of the restraint mounts, the question of its reasonable 
foreseeability may be different from that at the beginning of the 
period. If the court finds that initially the effect was not reasonably 
foreseeable, but that it was reasonably foreseeable after a period 
of six months, the section 402( 1) standard would be met at the 
end of six months and the Sherman Act would be applicable from 
that point forward. There would not be subject matter jurisdiction 
with respect to the conduct occuring prior to that time. 116 Ob-
viously, the same point can be made as well with respect to the 
direct and substantial elements of the standard. A practice having 
a direct and foreseen effect, but initially an insubstantial one, 
would not trigger application of the Sherman Act. The jurisdic-
tional standard would be met as soon as the effect became 
substantial. This point seems to be more critical with respect to 
the reasonable foreseeability element because of the relative ease 
with which a challenge can be made on the grounds of reasonable 
foreseeability. 
There are several other related points to be made regarding 
the section 402( 1) jurisdictional standard. The section 402( 1) 
standard is intended to play a limited role. The House Report 
clearly states that this standard merely sets forth the threshold 
allegation of conspiracy contains an implicit claim of intent. In Sanib Corp. v. United 
Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court held that an agreement 
between United Fruit and its subsidiaries to terminate supplies to plaintifPs Honduran 
plant, thereby preventing plaintiff from importing into the United States, "obviously 
was intended to, and in fact did, affect the interstate and foreign commerce." It is 
difficult to find cases in which the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See B. HAWK, supra note 9, at 35; Griffin, supra note 100, at 227. However, 
more recently this has happened. See the cases cited in note 121. 
115. Certainly in many cases proof of an!icompetitive conduct and the substantial 
consequences of it will show purpose or at least reasonable foreseeability. Moreover, if 
the reasonable foreseeability element requires, as is suggested, only a.showing that any 
effect was reasonably foreseeable, it may be fairly easy for plaintiff to establish this 
element of the standard. 
116. See House Report, supra note 14, at 9. 
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subject matter jurisdictional test for export and totally foreign 
commerce cases. 117 A plaintiffs showing of a direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect merely enables the court to take 
cognizance of the case. Proof of these elements does not prove 
the substantive violations of the statute. With respect to a section 
2 monopolization case, the section 402( 1) standard could not 
prove the case because the elements of the cause of action differ 
from the section 402 standard. In the rule of reason cases, care 
must be taken not to meld the jurisdictional standard and the 
substantive elements of plaintiffs case. 118 Proof of the direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect does not prove the 
reasonableness of the restraint. 119 It is clear from both the statutory 
language and the legislative history that meeting the jurisdictional 
standard does not constitute proof of the substantive violation. 
There is a lack of clarity, however, as to whether a proffer of 
proof of a substantive violation is necessary to satisfy the juris-
dictional standard. Subsection 402(2) raises this concern. 
The structure of section 402( 1) and (2) requires the interpre-
tation that two separate conditions must be met before subject 
matter jurisdiction can be exercised. First, the subsection ( 1) 
codified effects test must be met, and second, the direct, substantial 
and foreseeable effect found under subsection ( 1) must ''[give] 
rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 through 7 of 
this title [the Sherman Act], other than this section." 120 Subsection 
(2) was added to make it explicit that conduct involving beneficial 
effects is not subject to the antitrust laws. 121 Congress was con-
11 7. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 11; see also 128 GoNG. REc. H 4981 (daily ed. 
Aug. 3, 1982). 
118. See 1 W. FuGATE, supra note 29, § 5.2. 
119. /d. Mr. Fugate argues that once the jurisdictional test has been met, the 
quantum of the effect has no bearing on whether the practice constitutes a reasonable 
or an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
120. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (1982). 
121. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 11. Reference is made in the House Report 
to National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). In 
that case, National Bank of Canada instituted an action in the federal district court for 
the Southern District of New York to enjoin Interbank Card Association and Bank of 
Montreal from implementing a plan by which National Bank's Master Card credit 
card business would be discontinued. The circuit court affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the complaint. It concluded that there must be some showing of an 
anticompetitive effect of the conduct in the United States before subject matter 
jurisdiction could be asserted. /d. at 8. A similar conclusion was reached in Montreal 
Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1001 (1982); see also Eurim·Pharm. Gmbh v. Pfizer, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
, 66,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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cerned that if the jurisdictional standard of subsection ( 1) was 
stated without this qualifying language, the standard would be 
susceptible to the expansive reading that conduct having no 
anticompetitive effect in the United States, or even having a pro-
competitive effect here, would be reviewable under the Sherman 
Act. 122 Such an interpretation may give rise to an even more 
expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction, to the consternation of our 
trading partners. It may also be inconsistent with the theory of 
international law that a state has a right to assert its jurisdiction 
over conduct having an effect within its territory that is harmful 
or that constitutes an element of crime. 123 
The use of the word "effect" in section 402(2), in conjunction 
with the subsection (1) requirement that conduct have a direct, 
substantial, and foreseeable effect, may result in a reading of the 
''giving rise to a claim'' language as requiring or allowing a court 
to review the reasonableness of the effect at the jurisdictional 
stage. It would be more appropriate if a court merely would 
consider whether the effect on United States commerce results 
from an activity typically considered to give rise to an antitrust 
violation, such as price fixing or tie-in. Had subsection (2) been 
phrased in parallel language to subsection (1 ), e.g., "such conduct 
122. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 259 (Statement of the American Bar Association 
Section of International Law, at 9). 
123. In Alcoa, Judge Hand stated, "it is settled law ... that any state may impose 
liability even upon persons not within its allegiance for conduct outside its border that 
has consequences within its borders, which the state reprehends." (emphasis added). United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). The Restatement 
(Second) provides that: 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences 
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its 
territory, if either 
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements 
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal 
systems, or 
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which 
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs 
. as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) 
the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized 
by states having reasonably developed legal systems. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 89, § 18. See generally Haight, International Law and 
Extraterritorial Application of the AntitrllSt Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Jennings, 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. lNT'L L. 146 
(1957). But see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(REVISED) § 402(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1985) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT 
(REVISED)]. 
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[having a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect] gives rise 
to," it would more readily lend itself to this limited inquiry. 124 
Although the purpose of section 402(2) is clear, it is less certain 
whether the subsection adds anything not covered by prior law 
or other provisions of section 402. Under the old version of the 
Sherman Act it would be difficult to find a case in which a court 
assumed jurisdiction over conduct that did not have anticompe-
titive consequences for United States commerce. 125 In the cases 
usually considered to be at the outer limit of jurisdiction, the 
courts have strained to find an anticompetitive effect on United 
States commerce in order to justify jurisdiction. 126 To the extent 
that an anticompetitive effect is constructed, section 402(2) would 
be satisfied. Moreover, it is unlikely that a court would conclude 
that the codified effects standard was satisfied by a showing of 
only procompetitive effects. 
The absence of any statement in section 402 regarding the 
balancing of interest or comity analysis raises a final point 
regarding the jurisdictional test of section 402. Section 402 stands 
as a complete statement of the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
124. The second element of the Timberlane tripartite analysis is similar to § 402(2). 
"[A) greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary io demonstrate that the 
effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to plaintiffs and, therefore, a 
civil violation of the antitrust laws." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 
F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). This element is contrasted to the first which requires 
only a showing of some effect on foreign commerce. Professor Hawk raises the same 
concern with respect to the second element of the Timberlane test as is expressed here 
regarding § 402(2). B. HAwK, supra note 9, at 43. Judge Choy modified this second 
element later in the Timberlane opinion to mean that the effect need be only of a type 
cognizable as a violation. "We conclude, then, that the problem should be approached 
in three parts: Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign 
commerce of the United States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable 
as a violation of the Sherman Act?" Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615. This latter formulation 
is more compatible with the suggested interpretation for § 402(2). 
Section 402(2) is part of the subject matter jurisdiction determination. The precise 
role of the comparable provision in the Timberlane analysis is not clear. Atwood and 
Brewster believe that Judge Choy considered the second element to bear on the 
substantive scope of the Sherman Act, rather than on the subject matter jurisdiction 
question. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, § 6.13. 
125. But see infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussion of significance of place 
of conduct). 
126. In Dominicus Americana Bohia v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 
680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), for example, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, a United 
States corporation and the Dominican Republic's Tourist Information Center, conspired 
to monopolize the tourist facilities in one part of the Dominican Republic. The court 
found subject matter jurisdiction to exist on the theory that the defendants' conduct 
had an effect on United States export commerce because tourists "were 'exported' to 
take advantage of the services provided in the Dominican Republic." !d. at 688. 
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Sherman Act, at least with respect to export and totally foreign 
commerce. The absence of any reference to the now familiar 
comity or balancing of state interest analysis of the Timberlane 
opinion 127 creates the inference that such an analysis is not part 
of the subject matter jurisdiction determination. The House Report 
states that it is not a subject matter jurisdiction question, but 
rather a separate issue that a court may address. 128 In language 
surely not comforting to our trading partners, the House Report 
takes a neutral position on the issue of whether the comity issue 
should be addressed by a court. 129 The lack of any positive 
statement regarding the balancing of interest analysis certainly 
allows a court to decline to employ such analysis, and indeed 
may embolden a court to so decline on the theory that Congress 
does not consider it important. Moreover, the current concern 
over the utility of the balancing of interest analysis':w may provide 
127. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); see 
also Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on 
other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983); Montreal 
Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
128. The House Report states that "(ilf a court determines that the requirements for subject 
matter jurisdiction are met, this bill [H.R. 5235] would have no effect on the courts' ability 
to eqtploy notions of comity." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis 
added)( citing Timberlane). 
129. The House Report states that "the bill [H.R. 5235] is intended neither to 
prevent nor encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international 
characteristics of transactions." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13. In explaining the 
bill on the floor of the House of Representatives, Rep. McClory made a somewhat 
more affirmative statement. He noted that the bill established a rule of non-coverage. 
It determines when the Sherman Act does not apply. He stated that not every practice 
falling within the § 402 standard would be actionable as a matter of law. "H.R. 5235 
in no way affects the authority of a court to consider such matters [as the notion of 
comity] in cases where there is an anticompetitive domestic effect arising from exports 
or foreign trade." 128 CoNe. REc. H4982 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982). 
Professor Hawk argues that § 402 should not be interpreted as a rejection of the 
Timberlane balancing of interest analysis. He notes the expressly neutral position taken 
in the House Report, and suggests that § 402 should· be considered simply as a 
refinement of the first step of the Timberlane analysis. B. HAwK, supra note 9, at 22-23 
(Supp.). 
By way of contrast, § 40 of the Restatement (Second) provides that when two states 
have authority to prescribe rules which may require inconsistent conduct, each state is 
required by international law to consider modifying the exercise of its enforcement 
jurisdiction in light of, among other factors, the vital interests of each state, the extent 
of the hardship imposed on a person by inconsistent enforcement actions, and the 
nationality of the person affected. 
130. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on 
Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 
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an additional incentive to a court to decline to apply it in the 
absence of any statutory requirement that it do so. 
Use of the balancing of interest analysis should be a concomitant 
to section 402. Coupling the analysis with the "conduct involving" 
inquiry would allow a court to develop a flexible approach in 
interpreting "conduct involving" without undue concern that 
jurisdiction would automatically be exercised over activities in 
which another state has an interest. 131 
d. The Third Revision: The Scope of Damages 
The third, and perhaps most straight forward, of the substantive 
issues addressed in section 402 is a statement in the last sentence 
of the section on the ambit of damages. m This provision is not 
part of the subject matter jurisdiction determination. It delineates 
the scope of liability for certain Sherman Act violations. If the 
Sherman Act is . applicable because export or totally foreign 
restraints have had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect on the export trade of a person engaged in such trade in 
the United States, the only reviewable conduct is that which 
causes injury to the export business in the United States. The 
first substantive issue raised by section 402-the dichotomy be-
tween import trade and other foreign trade-has narrowed the 
ambit of liability. A plaintiff can sue for injunctive relief or 
damages on the basis of conduct found to be in export trade or 
totally foreign trade only if the effect of such conducf is direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable. Such effect must be either 
on the domestic commerce or import commerce (subsection 
402(l)(A)) or the export commerce of a person engaged in such 
commerce in the United States (subsection 402(1)(B)). 
The last sentence of section 402 means that if subject matter 
jurisdiction exists solely because the requisite effect of the conduct 
is on the export trade, the plaintiff, presumably the entity whose 
export trade was affected, can recover only for the injury suffered 
VA. J lNT'L L. 395 (1983); Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 
AM. J COMP. L. 1 (1984); Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman 
Act: Encouraging Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 N.W.J. lNT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982); 
Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. CaMP. L. 579 (1983). 
131. See generally 1 W. FuGATE, supra note 29, § 2. 9: · . 
132. "If sections 1 through 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the 
operation of paragraph ( 1 )(B) then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such 
conduct only for injury to the export business in the United States." 15 U .S.C. § 6a 
(1982). 
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in the United States. Although such person may be either a 
domestic or foreign entity, the ambit of damages is limited to 
injury to the export trade in the United States. 1:n If, on the other 
hand, the restrictive practice has the requisite effect on domestic 
or import commerce, this limitation does not apply, and the 
statute leaves open the possibility that damages may be sought 
for broader consequences of the conduct. Again, this provision, 
like the codified effects standard, is not applicable to conduct 
involving import commerce. 
D. Other Issues Raised by Section 402 
By implication the FT AlA answers questions not clearly resolved 
under the old Sherman Act. Was conduct engaged in within the 
133. The facts of Todhunter-Mitchel! Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 
610 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1979), are interesting to consider 
on this point. The defendant prohibited its distributors in Miami and New Orleans 
from reselling any of its beer for export to the Bahamas. This restraint was imposed 
to protect the exclusivity of Anheuser's distributor in the Bahamas. The plaintiff, a 
Bahamian corporation engaged in the business of distributing beer in the Bahamas 
thus was unable to purchase the defendant's beer for resale there. The plaintiff alleged 
that this conduct constituted a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The defendant 
argued that the Sherman Act ought not be applied to grant relief to a foreign corporation 
for injury suffered in a foreign country. The court noted that the defendant was a 
Missouri corporation and that the act constituting the antitrust violation· occurred 
primarily in the United States. The court found subject matter jurisdiction to exist 
because the restraint affected the flow of exports. 375 F. Supp. at 624-25, modified, 383 
F. Supp. at 587-88. It relied on Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Societe Anonyme de 
Gerance, 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971), as a basis for concluding that the foreign 
citizenship of plaintiff Todhunter-Mitchel! did not preclude it from bringing suit. In 
Muller a Swiss corporation sued a French corporation. The district court refused to 
dismiss the antitrust suit, noting that the defendant had offices in the United States 
and the conduct in furtherance of its antitrust claim occurred here. Todhunter-Mitchel/, 
375 F. Supp. at 625. 
If§ 402 were in effect, it could be argued that plaintiff could not recover. By the last 
sentence of § 402, if jurisdiction existed only because of § 402(1)(B), plaintiff would 
be limited to recovery for injury to its export business in the United States. On the 
facts in this case plaintiff had no such business and, accordingly, could not recover. 
Bruce and Peirce, supra note 9, at 994-95, note that while the purpose of Anheuser's 
conduct was to advantage its Bahamian distributor, thereby affecting United States 
exports, the conduct took place in the United States. The United States distributors 
were forbidden to sell to the plaintiff. They suggest an argument the plaintiffs might 
raise to support its right to recover for injury suffered in the Bahamas. Because. the 
defendant's conduct took place in the United States, § 402 is inapplicable. The restraint 
was in interstate commerce, not foreign commerce. The plaintiff is thus, under the 
approach of Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 ( 1978), able to state a 
claim for its worldwide damages. For a discussion of the applicable standard for conduct 
restraining interstate and foreign commerce, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying 
text. 
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United States but having its only anticompetitive effect outside 
its territory violative of the old Sherman Act? 134 Was such conduct 
to be reviewed against the interstate or foreign commerce require-
ments of that statute? Clearly, under section 402, the effects of 
such conduct occurring in export or foreign commerce must be 
felt in United States commerce before jurisdiction could be 
exercised. With respect to restraints on import commerce, it is 
likewise thought that jurisdiction does not exist without an effect 
on United States foreign or domestic commerce. m However, less 
attention has been focused on the place of the conduct. t:Jii The 
134. In illustrating the uncertainty surrounding the application of the Sherman Act 
to conduct intended to have, and in fact having, its only effect outside the United 
States, Atwood and Brewster raise the hypothetical situation of General Motors and 
Ford agreeing in Detroit that their cars manufactured here would not be exported to 
Iceland for less than $10,000 per car. They state that no clear answer can be given as 
to whether this agreement violates the Sherman Act. 1 J. ATwooD & K. BREWSTER, 
supra note 3, § 7.03; see B. HAWK, supra note 9, at 46. 
135. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 100, at 5-6; 1 W. FuGATE, supra note 29, §§ 
2.20-.21. 
136. In Todhunter-Mitchell Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610, 624-
25 (E.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1979), Anheuser's conduct 
prohibiting its Miami and New Orleans distributors from selling to plaintiffs was carried 
out in this country. The court acknowledged that the purpose and effect of the restraint 
were to eliminate competition in a foreign market. But it concluded that subject matter 
jurisdiction existed because the result was achieved by restricting trade in this country. 
Conduct here having its intended effect outside the United States supported jurisdiction. 
See also United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 
1950). 
The approach is compatible with Professor Rahl's thesis that foreign commerce 
embraces conduct in and conduct affecting foreign commerce and that the substantial 
effect on commerce requirement applies only to the latter. Consistent with the interstate 
commerce cases, separate effect need not be shown for conduct in the flow of interstate 
or foreign commerce. Accordingly, an effect in this country is not required, and the 
Sherman Act can reach conduct violating the Act even if the only effect is outside the 
United States. Rahl, Fqreign Commercejurisdiction, supra note 30, at 523-27; Rahl, American 
Antitrust, supra note 30, at 6-8. Presumably such conduct, not having an effect here, 
must be engaged in within the United States for there to be any basis for jurisdiction. 
The position of the Justice Department, to the contrary, is that there must be an 
effect on United States consumers or export opportunities before jurisdiction can attach, 
regardless of the place of the conduct. Antitrust Guide, supra note 100, at 7; Address 
by Douglas E. Rosenthal (Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, 
Department of Justice), "Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U.S. Export Trade," before 
the American Society of International Law (April 23, 1977), partially reprinted in 71 AM. 
Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 214-15 (1977). Mr. Rosenthal contended that restraints in export 
trade injuring only persons in foreign markets may not be subject to the jurisdiction 
of United States courts. The conduct he referred to was undertaken within the United 
States. See B. HAwK, supra note 9, at 45-52. This continues to be the Justice Department's 
position. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, § 7.04 (Supp. 1984)(referring 
to speech before World Trade Institute seminar by chief of Justice Department's Foreign 
Commerce Section); 1 W. FUGATE, supra note 29, § 2.25. 
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legislative history of the FT AlA is replete with discussion of one 
of its purposes: to enable United States companies to compete 
abroad and to free such companies from the constraints of the 
Sherman Act, absent the requisite effect here. 137 Congress was 
not limiting its concern to activities of United States companies 
that take place outside this country. Congress's intent was to 
assist United States companies in their export activities. Such 
activities also would entail conduct within the country. Conse-
quently, conduct engaged in within the United States should be 
reviewed under the FT AlA if it is conduct involving export or 
totally foreign commerce. 138 This conclusion raises the troublesome 
question of the applicable subject matter test for conduct which 
is a restraint of both interstate and foreign (export or totally 
foreign) commerce. Is such conduct to be reviewed under section 
402 or the old Sherman Act or both? Section 402( 1) states that 
the Sherman Act is not applicable to conduct involving foreign 
commerce, other than import commerce, unless there is the 
requisite effect. Therefore, all conduct in foreign commerce, 
including that which is also a restraint of domestic commerce, 
should be viewed as foreign commerce and reviewed only under 
section 402. Although it is murky on this point, the legislative 
history does support this conclusion. The House Report notes 
rather ambiguously that if a domestic export cartel were to have 
a spillover effect on commerce within this country, "the cartel's 
conduct would fall within the reach of our antitrust laws.'' 139 The 
reference to "our antitrust laws" is not specific. However, the 
Report continues on to note that the impact on domestic commerce 
"would, at least over time, meet the test of a direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce. " 140 
Again, it is unclear whether review of the subject matter juris-
137. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2, 7, & 10; 128 CoNe. REc. H4981 (daily 
ed. Aug. 3, 1982). 
138. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 258 (Statement of American Bar Association 
Section on International Law, at 7) in which it is noted that H.R. 5235, "[b)y ignoring 
where the conduct takes place and instead considering where the conduct's effect is 
felt, ... corresponds to the traditional antitrust theory." Because the FTAIA does not 
deal with import commerce, the uncertainty still exists in that sphere. However, it is 
unlikely that conduct involving imports would be challenged if there is no effect here. 
The question of the applicable standard for review of such conduct does remain open. 
It is uncertain whether restrictive practices regarding imports carried out in the United 
Stat::s will be considered against the subject matter jurisdiction tests for domestic or 
foreign conduct. · 
139. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13. 
140. /d. 
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diction over activities restraining foreign and domestic commerce 
only under section 402 would yield a different result than if the 
conduct were reviewed under the standards applicable to activities 
that are domestic both as to place of conduct and effect. This 
question raises all of the previously considered questions regarding 
the breadth of the ''conduct involving'' element. To the extent 
that "conduct involving" export commerce is interpreted broadly, 
activities otherwise reviewable as being totally in interstate com-
merce will be brought within section 402. Ironically, a broad 
interpretation of this term with respect to exports may afford 
companies greater freedom from constraints of the Sherman Act, 
yet a broad interpretation may result in greater scrutiny for import 
commerce. 
III. THE RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) 
The other movement to modify the extraterritorial application 
of United States law is the current effort of the American Law 
Institute to redraft the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States. In 1981 the ALI disseminated Tentative Draft 
No. 2, Part IV of which dealt with jurisdiction, among other 
issues. The sections dealing with jurisdiction were revised and 
republished in 1985 in Tentative Draft No. 6. 141 Although im-
portant and controversial, the jurisdictional principles of the 
Restatement (Revised) are only a small portion of this wide-
ranging work. The most recent version of the text of the sections 
relevant to this discussion have been available for only a short 
time. However, some general comments on the approach of the 
Restatement (Revised) approach can be made, and this approach 
can be contrasted with that of the FTAIA. 
Certainly Congress could not wait for final approval of the 
Restatement (Revised) before proceeding to enact the FT AlA. 
However, the differences in approach of these two efforts are 
nevertheless unfortunate, perhaps more for the Restatement (Re-
vised) than for the FTAIA. 142 
141. See supra note 2 (explanation of revisions of Restatement). 
142. It has been observed that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States is especially important because of the relative paucity of case law in this 
area and the intertwining of domestic law with international law and relations. Therefore, 
a specific legislative effort at odds with this Restatement would seem to adversely affect 
the stature of the Restatement. Houck, The New ALI Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States- Problems for Practioners, 26 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 37 (Southwestern 
Legal Foundation 1983). 
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It should be noted that the jurisdictional principles of the 
Restatement (Revised) are not a statement of United States 
domestic law regarding jurisdiction, as is the FTAIA. Instead, 
the principles state certain precepts of international law which are 
said to circumscribe domestic law and are to be applied both 
domestically and internationally. These precepts establish when 
the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe law is appropriate and 
minimize the conflict among states in their exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 143 The Restatement (Revised) approach is to first set forth 
general principles with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction 144 
and then to state more specific rules for the exercise of jurisdiction 
in various subject matter areas. Sections 402 and 403 of the 
Restatement (Revised) articulate the general principles governing 
the prescription of jurisdiction. Section 415 sets forth the specific 
application of these principles to the antitrust area. 145 
Section 402 states the bases upon which a nation state may 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe its law. 146 One of the most striking 
features of section 402 of the Restatement (Revised) is its intro-
ductory phrase. The introductory phrase clearly states that section 
402 is entirely modified by section 403. Section 403(1) provides 
that ''Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under [section] 
402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe 
law with respect to the activities, relations, status or interests of 
persons or things having connections with another state or states 
143. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, Introduction; Part IV, Introductory 
Note; Chapter 1, Subchapter A, Introductory Note. 
144. Restatement (Revised) § 401 describes three aspects of the exercise of jurisdiction: 
jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce. A state exercising its jurisdiction to 
prescribe makes "its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or 
interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by 
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court." /d. § 401. 
145. The application of these principles to the other subject matter areas are contained 
in: §§ 411-13 jurisdiction to tax; § 414 jurisdiction to control foreign subsidiaries of 
United States corporations; and § 416 securities transactions. 
146. Restatement (Revised) § 402 reads in its entirety as follows: 
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
(1) (a)conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory; 
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; 
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial 
effect within its territory; 
(2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside as well as 
within its territory; or 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is 
directed against the security of the state or a limited class of other state interests. 
/d. § 402. 
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when the exercise of such Jurisdiction is unreasonable.'' 147 Section 403 
continues on to list factors to be evaluated to determine if the 
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable in a given case. 
Hence, in sharp contrast to the FTAIA, which is silent with 
respect to the balancing of state interest analysis, the Restatement 
(Revised) provides that a state must undertake a balancing of 
interest analysis before it may exercise jurisdiction. If, as a result 
of this analysis, a court seeking to exercise jurisdiction concludes 
that to do so would be unreasonable, the court would violate 
international law if it exercised jurisdiction. Comment a to section 
403 states that the principle that an exercise of jurisdiction is 
unlawful if it is unreasonable is established in United States law 
and has emerged as a principle of international law. 148 Satisfaction 
147. /d. § 403 (1) (emphasis added). Restatement (Revised)§ 403 reads in its entirety 
as follows: 
§ 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state 
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the activities, 
relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections with 
another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged 
by evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate, 
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, 
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating 
state; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the 
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or 
regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation 
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, 
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation in question; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic 
system; 
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states. 
(3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction 
over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more states are in 
conflict, each state is expected to evaluate its own as well as the other state's 
interest in exercising of jurisdiction in light of all the relevant factors, including 
those set out in Subsection (2); and to defer to the other state i( that state's 
interest is greater. 
!d. § 403. 
148. !d. § 403, comment a. 
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of the principle of reasonableness is a precondition to the exercise 
of jurisdiction by any state, and this principle is the fulcrum by 
which conflicting assertions of jurisdiction by states are minimized. 
By the Restatement's (Revised) approach, the balancing of interest 
analysis is not a matter of comity, as it is in Timberlane; rather, 
it has been elevated to a mandatory principle of law. 149 This 
movement has understandably caused a great deal of contro-
versy.150 
The failure of Congress to require explicitly the balancing of 
state interest analysis could be viewed as a statement contrary to 
the emerging principle of international law referred to in section 
403, comment a, and in turn this failure may cast doubt on the 
status of the principle. Section 402 of the FTAIA is silent on this 
149. The interest balancing analysis in Timberlane is an application of Kingman 
Brewster's exhortation for a "jurisdictional rule or reason." K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST 
AND AMERICAN BusiNESS ABROAD 301·06, 446-48 (1958). Mr. Brewster, in this work, 
and Messrs. Atwood and Brewster in the revision of it, argue that although the interest 
analysis may be a matter of comity, rules of conflicts of laws dictate that the analysis 
be undertaken. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, § 19.05. 
The mandatory nature of the state interest analysis under international law is not new 
to the Restatement in §§ 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Revised). Section 40 of the 
Restatement (Second) contains a comparable provision, limited to situations in which 
two states have asserted jurisdiction. See supra note 129 (explanation of Restatement 
(Second) § 40). Sections 402 and 403 are not so limited. By their terms, a court or 
agency seeking to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe or apply law on its own initiative, 
or at the request of one of the parties, must engage in the interest balancing anaylsis, 
even though the other state has not previously asserted jurisdiction over the matter. 
This could lead to state A's concluding that it would be unreasonable to assert 
jurisdiction, because by its analysis state B has a more significant interest in the matter, 
and state B in turn not exercising jurisdiction. Section 403(3) covers the converse 
situation. By it, if both states A and B conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable, and they exercise their jurisdiction in conflicting ways, jurisdiction must 
be moderated by the principle of reasonableness. The state with the lesser, although 
reasonable, interest would be expected to cease its exercise of jurisdiction. See REs-
TATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 403, comments d and e; Maier, Resolving 
Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back Again," 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984). 
150. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 
(D. C. Cir. 1984 ); Maier, supra note 149; Messen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary 
International Law, 78 ·AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1983); Robinson, Conflicts of jurisdiction and 
the Draft Restatement, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1147 (1983). During the 1985 Annual 
Meeting of the American Law Institute a motion was made to eliminate the mandatory 
nature of the reasonableness inquiry. The motion failed. Also at the 1981 Annual 
Meeting of the American Law Institute, during the discussion of these sections as stated 
in Tentative Draft No.2, a motion was made to amend § 402(1)(a), (b), and (2) to 
provide that the principle of reasonableness not apply to them. The motion failed. 
Proceedings, 58th Annual Meeting of The American Law Institute 275-86 (1981). 
During the discussion of the motion, it was recognized that § 402(1)(c) presented the 
most common setting for clashes of assertion of jurisdiction by states; the motion would 
have allowed the reasonableness principle to apply to that subsection. 
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point and, therefore, not literally inconsistent with the pos1t10n 
of the Restatement (Revised). Because the legislative history 
recognizes the right of a court to engage in the balancing of 
interest analysis, 151 it can be argued convincingly that the reason-
ableness analysis is an additional step which a court must take, 
along with the subject matter determination under FT AlA section 
402, before jurisdiction can be exercised. 152 However, FTAIA 
section 402 states that subject matter jurisdiction exists if the 
requisite effect is found on United States commerce. A court 
would be free to apply the Sherman Act if it finds subject matter 
jurisdiction. 153 In contrast, the Restatement (Revised) provides 
that as a matter of international law a state may not exercise 
jurisdiction if it would be unreasonable to do so. 154 The deter-
mination of whether exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case 
is reasonable requires the balancing of state interest analysis. 155 
The elements to be considered in the balancing of interest 
analysis of the Restatement (Revised) differ somewhat in breadth 
from those used in Timberlane and its progeny. 156 As listed in these 
151. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (explanation of legislative history 
of FTAIA). 
152. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 415, comment k notes the need of 
United States courts in antitrust cases to find subject matter jurisdiction. It states that 
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction does not eliminate the need to make· the 
reasonableness inquiry for international purposes. 
153. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (explanation of legislative history 
of FTAIA). Mr. Fugate believes that the FTAIA enables a court to exercise jurisdiction 
immediately on finding that the tests of § 402 are met, without regard to the comity 
analysis. 1 W. FUGATE, supra note 29, § 2.15 (Supp.); Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of the 
Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 49, 61 (1984). 
154. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 403(1). 
155. fr 1. § 403(2). 
156. h. § 403(2)(a)-(h). As articulated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 
549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), the factors to be considered are: (1) degree of 
conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) nationality or allegiance of parties and location 
or principal places of business of corporations; (3) extent to which enforcement by 
either state can be expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of the 
effects of the activity in the United States as compared with those elsewhere; (5) the 
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; (6) the 
foreseeability of such effect; and (7) the relative importance to the violations charged 
of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 
1979), the list of items to be considered in the balancing analysis was expanded to 
read: (1) degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) nationality of parties; (3) 
relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here as compared to that abroad; 
(4) availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (5) existence 
of intent to harm or effect American commerce and its foreseeability; (6) possible effect 
upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) if relief 
is granted, whether party will be placed in position of being required to perform an 
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cases, the factors are centered on the relative interests of the states 
involved and the practicality of a court in one state taking 
jurisdiction and issuing orders with respect to entities or events 
in the other. 157 The list in Restatement (Revised) section 403 
includes these general notions, but broadens the inquiry to consider 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is important to the international 
political, legal, and economic system and is consistent with the 
traditions of the international system. 158 
Sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Revised) do not 
require a showing of any adverse effect of the conduct in a state 
before jurisdiction can be exercised. Section 402(1)(c) provides 
that a court may take jurisdiction over conduct outside the state 
"which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its 
territory." 159 In contrast, the FT AlA requires that there be an 
anticompetitive effect in the United States for a United States 
court to take subject matter jurisdiction. 160 Nonetheless, this 
difference may be of little significance because the interest bal-
ancing analysis of the Restatement (Revised) would most likely 
moderate assertions of jurisdiction over conduct not having harm-
ful effects. 
Section 415 of the Restatement (Revised) 161 is described as 
applying the principles of sections 402 and 403 to the exercise of 
act illegal in either country, or be placed under conflicting requirements by both 
countries; (8) whether the court can make its order effective; (9) whether the order for 
relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation· under similar 
circumstances; (10) whether a treaty with the affected nation has addressed the issue. 
157. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 3, §§ 6.10-.11; B. HAwK, supra 
note 9, at 39-44; Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress Report 
on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311 (1982); Swan, supra note 9, at 
199-208; 
158. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 403(2)(e) & (f). It has been suggested 
that the factors to be included in the interest analysis ought to be reformulated to take 
even greater account of the needs of the interdependent world community, and perhaps 
to place less emphasis on the interests of the competing nation states. Maier, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law; 76 
AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 300-03, 317 (1982); see also Swan, supra note 9, at 206-07. 
159. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 402(1)(c). 
160. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
161. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 415 reads in its entirety as follows: 
§ 415. Jurisdiction to Apply Antitrust Laws: Law of the United States 
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade made in the United 
States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade carried out in 
significant measure in the United States, is subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe 
of the United States, regardless of the nationality or place of business of the 
parties to the agreement or of the participants in the conduct. 
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade made outside of the 
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade carried 
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jurisdiction in antitrust matters within the United States. 162 Unlike 
sections 402 and 403, section 415 purports to state United States 
domestic law. 163 The three subsections of section 415 delineate 
categories of conduct of varying degrees of interest to the United 
States, from the most to the least compelling. The three subsections 
make no distinctions as to the types of commerce affected by the 
agreements or the conduct they describe. The old Sherman Act's 
division of commerce into commerce among the states or with 
foreign nations and FT AlA section 402 's distinction between 
import and export or totally foreign commerce, are not relevant 
for purposes of section 415. Because the scheme of section 415 
would allow jurisdiction to be exercised with respect to all conduct, 
domestic or foreign, fitting within the parameters of the subsec-
tions, it could be argued that seCtion 415 authorizes a broader 
assertion of jurisdiction than the Sherman Act as amended by the 
FTAIA. 164 
Under subsection 1 of section 415 any agreement in restraint 
of United States trade made in the United States and any conduct 
in restraint of such commerce, if carried out predominately in the 
United States, is subject to United States jurisdiction, without 
any showing of the nationality of the participants or locus of the 
effects. By the terms of this section, the United States could exer-
·cise jurisdiction to challenge an agreement made here by United 
States or foreign persons even if the effects were felt entirely out-
side the United States. 165 
Subsection 2 is largely a variant of the Alcoa effects test. 166 If 
the purpose of the conduct, carried out predominately outside the 
out predominantly outside of the United States, is subject to the jurisdiction to 
rrescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement 
is to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the agreement or 
conduct has some effect on that commerce. 
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are subject 
to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or 
conduct have substantial effect on the commerce of the United States and the 
exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable. 
162. /d. § 415, comment a. 
163. Section 415 is captioned "Jurisdiction to Apply Antitrust Laws: Law of the 
United States." /d. § 415. 
164. The Reporters' Notes acknowledge this possibility. /d. § 415, Reporters' Notes 
No.8. 
165. Under Restatement (Revised), supra note 123, § 415(1) the United States would 
have jurisdiction to challenge the hypothetical agreement referred to in note 134. 
Although Section 415 would allow ju.risdiction to be asserted over export conduct, the 
purpose of the ETCA and the FT AlA is to limit such assertions as a matter of domestic 
law. 
166. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443·44 (2d Cir. 
1945 )(effects test). 
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United States, is to affect United States commerce, and if there 
is some effect on that commerce, United States courts may assert 
jurisdiction. Along the line of Alcoa, a principal purpose coupled 
with any effect beyond the de minimus is sufficient to support 
jurisdiction. It is unclear whether the purpose element of section 
415(2) means only something analogous to specific intent, or if 
notions like general intent inferred from conduct would be suffi-
cient. Use of the words "a principal purpose" supports the 
conclusion that a specific purpose to affect United States commerce 
is required. 167 It is not clear why a ''purpose'' test rather than 
the more usual "intent" standard from Alcoa was employed, or 
whether there is an intended distinction between the two. 
Subsection (3) would authorize jurisdiction over other agree-
ments or conduct in restraint of United States trade only if the 
effect on United States commerce is substantial and if the assertion 
of jurisdiction is not unreasonable. The factual distinction between 
the conduct described in subsections (2) and (3) is largely that 
subsection (2) is limited to purposeful conduct having some effect 
on United States commerce, while subsection (3) covers conduct 
not meeting the purpose requirement of subsection (2), but having 
a substantial effect on United States commerce. 
It seems to be automatically or presumptively reasonable for 
the United States to exercise jurisdiction over conduct described 
in sections 415 (1) and (2). Apparently a court confronted with 
these types of conduct need not apply separately the interest 
balancing analysis of section 403. Functionally, subsections ( 1) 
and (2) do not require a separate showing of reasonableness; 
instead, the language of these subsections incorporates the rea-
sonableness inquiry. The assumption underlying these subsections 
seems to be that the balance is in favor of authority to exercise 
jurisdiction over conduct falling within them. 168 
167. Restatement (Revised) § 415, comment a describes the purpose element in a 
way approaching specific intent. It notes that § 415(2) is a special formulation of the 
rules of § 402(1)(c) "in that it states that if a principal purpose of the challenged 
activity is to interfere with the commerce of the United States .... '' -jurisdiction is 
presumptively reasonable. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 123, § 415, comment a. 
168. /d. The comment notes that it would rarely be a problem to meet the 
reasonableness standard with respect to subsection (I) conduct and that an exercise of 
jurisdiction with respect to subsection (2) conduct is presumptively reasonable. The 
concession in the comment that all conduct described in § 415 is subject to the overriding 
principle of reasonableness is literally more moderate than the position taken in Tentative 
Draft No. 2 in which the statement was made that assertion of jurisdiction over 
subsections (I) and (2) conduct is clearly reasonable. 
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The statement in comment a to section 415 to the effect that 
an exercise of jurisdiction by the United States is at least pres-
umptively reasonable with respect to conduct falling within sub-
sections ( 1) and (2) relieves a court of the need to undertake the 
balancing analysis in some cases. This is particularly true in 
subsection ( 1) cases, which involve conduct at least predominately 
in the United States that restrains commerce. The conclusion is less 
convincing with respect to subsection (2) conduct, which is conduct 
predominately outside the United States that is intended to and 
does affect United States commerce. Subsection 2 presumptively 
would authorize jurisdiction in such cases as Alcoa and perhaps 
Timberlane. Because the assertion of jurisdiction over conduct of 
non-United States citizens taking place outside the United States 
is one of the excesses for which the United States is criticized, 
there is concern that section 415 may do little to moderate 
application of the antitrust laws in such situations. 
If the reasonableness analysis were performed when restraints 
fitting within subsections 415 ( 1) and (2) were reviewed, the 
conflict between the FT AlA and the Restatement (Revised) would 
largely disappear. The first of the reasonableness factors to be 
considered within section 403 is the extent to which the activity 
takes place within or ''has substantial, direct and foreseeable 
effect in or upon the regulating state.'' 169 Because this is essentially 
the codified effects standard of the FT AlA, its use would make 
the two efforts congruent. 
The words "a principal purpose" of subsection (2) also become 
critical with respect to conduct falling within subsections (2) and 
(3). A broad interpretation of this language will move into 
subsection (2) conduct which would otherwise be reviewable only 
after a determination under section 403 that the exercise of 
jurisdiction is reasonable. Such an interpretation would undo the 
entire balancing scheme which the Restatement (Revised) seeks 
to accomplish. This interpretation of the interrelationship of 
subsections (2) and (3) supports the conclusion that the purpose 
element of subsection (2) should be construed narrowly, analo-
gously to specific intent. To limit these words to instances in 
which there is an explicit articulated purpose to affect United 
States trade, although possible, may make the subsection largely 
useless. In most situations the agreement will be entered into or 
conduct engaged in for the purpose of achieving some specific 
169. /d. § 403(2)(a). 
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personal advantage for the participants. The partiCipants may 
realize that as a consequence of their conduct United States trade 
will be affected. Subsection (2) requires that a principal purpose, 
not the principal purpose, be to affect United States trade. Thus, 
conduct engaged in for personal motives, with knowledge of the 
consequential effect on United States trade, may or may not be 
sufficient. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The Restatement (Revised) and the FT AlA proceed differently 
regarding the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. 
There are also some similarities between the two. The FTAIA 
does not require the reasonableness analysis that the Restatement 
(Revised) requires. Yet to the extent that a court believes it must 
employ this analysis, either for reasons of comity or in compliance 
with a precept of international law, the central aim of the 
Restatement (Revised) is satisfied. Assuming the reasonableness 
analysis is employed, the FTAIA probably circumscribes appli-
cation of the ~herman Act more than the Restatement (Revised) 
requires. Section 402 of the FTAIA's codified effects standard 
and the FT AlA's scope of damages provision are narrower, in 
terms of requirements, than section 415 of the Restatement 
(Revised). Motive or purpose has been consciously abandoned in 
the FT AlA whereas it remains a significant factor in the scheme 
of the Restatement (Revised). 
While these two efforts at moderating antitrust jurisdiction are 
probably not substantively at odds, they are different. Insofar as 
export restraints are concerned, the FTAIA is more restrictive 
than the Restatement (Revised). It is unlikely, however, given 
the fact that United States law was recently revised, that the 
provisions of the Restatement (Revised) would soon be incorpo-
rated into statutory law. 
